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The Dilemma of Interstatutory
Interpretation
Anuj C. Desai*
Abstract
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time,
relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts
nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining
when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an
interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what
are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is
appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in
pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes
are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same
subject,” the court then treats the two statutes as though they were
one. The doctrine thus permits judges to use ordinary doctrines of
intra-statute interpretation across the two statutes. Determining
that two statutes are “on the same subject” thus gives interpreters
a powerful tool of interstatutory interpretation.
How, then, should courts determine whether to treat two
statutes as one? If we frame the question through the lens of the
two
currently
predominant
theories
of
statutory
interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—we can see that
*
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the traditional approach of asking about the statutes’ “subject
matter” in the abstract makes little sense. For textualist judges
who care about objective meaning, it makes more sense to engage
in interstatutory cross-referencing if and only if the audience for
the two statutes—the appropriately informed objective reader of
the statutes—is the same. For interpreters who care about
subjective legislative intent, interstatutory cross-referencing would
generally be appropriate if and only if the two statutes were
drafted by and came through the same Congressional committees.
Even if one rejects my proposed approaches, thinking about
how to fit interstatutory cross-referencing into modern theories of
statutory interpretation raises some confounding issues for those
theories. In particular, it requires textualists to articulate
explicitly who the audience for any given statute is, for without
doing so, the textualist has no theoretical basis for determining
when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate and when it
is not. Thus, irrespective of the specifics of my proposals, looking
at the ancient doctrine of in pari materia through the lens of
modern theories of statutory interpretation sheds light on
important questions about statutory interpretation that courts and
theorists have largely ignored.
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I. Introduction
Statutory interpretation theory has failed to grapple
seriously with a common technique in statutory interpretation:
interstatutory cross-referencing. 1 Courts do it all the time, 2 and
1. I borrow the term from Professor William Buzbee. See William W.
Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
171, 174 (2000); see also Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for
the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998)
(discussing the use of interstatutory cross-referencing as part of the Court’s
“integrative function in the larger lawmaking process”).
2. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the
Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 221, 234–36 (2010) (showing that for the 166 statutory interpretation cases
determined by the Roberts Court during its first three and a half terms, the
Supreme Court referenced other statutes 39.2% of the time).
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yet scholars and courts have no theoretical framework for when it
is appropriate. To start, it is not even clear as an analytical
matter whether a second statute, one that is not the statute being
interpreted, is an intrinsic or extrinsic aid to interpretation. 3 Is a
cross-referenced statute just part of the broader context for the
statutory provision being interpreted? Or, because it is outside
the four corners of the statute being interpreted, is it thus
effectively comparable to, say, legislative history? Or, is it
comparable to looking at a dictionary as an interpretive aid,
which despite being an “extrinsic” aid in literal terms, is viewed
as an acceptable source by virtually all judges, including
textualists who reject the use of legislative history? So, for
example, is the fee-shifting provision of the Toxic Substances
Control Act part of the broader context for understanding the
fee-shifting provisions in the Civil Rights Act Amendments of
1976? 4 Or, should courts ignore it because it is a different statute
altogether? How should courts, whether using a textualist or
intentionalist methodology, decide whether it is appropriate to
look to the former when interpreting the latter? It turns out,
courts have no good way to answer this question, and, for all the
focus on the theory of statutory interpretation over the last four
decades, 5 scholars have not answered the question in any
analytically satisfying way either. 6
3. Compare, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 170 (6th ed. 2000) (referring to other statutes as an
“extrinsic aid”), with id. § 51.01, at 172–73 (referring to the technique as “a
variation of the principle that all parts of a [single] statute should . . . be
construed together”).
4. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991)
(using the fee-shifting provisions the Toxic Substances Control Act and others to
interpret whether expert fees in civil rights litigation could be shifted to the
losing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988)); see
generally infra Part III.D.
5. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (2003) (referring to “the continuing
cascade of statutory interpretation theories over the past twenty years”).
6. See Deborah W. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The
Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 866 (2012)
(noting that “[q]uestions regarding how courts determine whether a valid
statutory precedent controls a case, particularly when the case arose under a
different statute, . . . have been far less considered [by scholars]”).
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In this Article, I address the question of when a court should
cross-reference another statute to help its interpretive process,
but I do so through the lens of modern theories of statutory
interpretation. I take no position on the appropriateness of any
given methodology, but instead start with the two principal
modalities of statutory interpretation in the federal courts today:
textualism and intentionalism. 7 I focus on a long-standing
doctrine, one that dates at least as far back as Blackstone, 8 the
so-called “in pari materia” (or “on the same subject”) doctrine, and
seek to understand when that doctrine should apply based on
those two modalities.
As we will see, the payoff is significant. By doing this, I
address the question of when courts should engage in
interstatutory cross-referencing. More importantly though,
viewing the question through the lens of modern theories of
statutory interpretation not only helps us understand
interstatutory cross-referencing, but also reflects back to shed
light on the theories of statutory interpretation themselves.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II explains what the in
pari materia doctrine is and then explains where it fits
jurisprudentially as a technique in statutory interpretation.
Part III looks at interstatutory cross-referencing through the
lens of textualism as a modality in statutory interpretation. For a
textualist, the question of when interstatutory cross-referencing
is appropriate has no easy answer: there is no plain meaning to
rely on, no dictionary to turn to, and no linguistic canon to apply.
Instead, one must look to the underlying rationales of textualism
and to the notion of the appropriately informed objective reader.
7. As a preliminary matter, I should note that my discussion throughout
is premised on the interpretation of federal statutes in federal court. Many of
the principles might apply, with appropriate adjustments, to the interpretation
of state statutes. But, as will be apparent shortly, because my proposals are
based on both the lawmaking process and the audience for particular statutes,
they depend on factors that will vary between the federal and state levels and
from state to state. More on why I have chosen intentionalism, but not
purposivism below. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*60 n.54 (14th ed. 1803) (“It is an established rule of construction that statutes
in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be construed with reference to
each other.”).
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As I explain in more detail, to be true to those rationales and to
textualism’s emphasis on the objective meaning of the text
requires consideration of factors outside of the textualist’s usual
toolbox: it requires an explicit articulation of who the statutory
reader for a particular statute is and whether the audience for
the two statutes is the same. I go further and argue that doing
this effectively requires the interpreter to understand the
boundaries of legal practice areas in the real world of lawyering,
but even if one disagrees with that claim, the question of
determining a statute’s audience cannot be avoided.
Part IV turns to the intentionalist modality in statutory
interpretation as a lens for determining when interstatutory
cross-referencing is appropriate. In contrast to textualists, who
are focused on statutory readers, subjective intentionalists focus
on statutory authors. I argue that a subjective intentionalist can
make a first-cut probabilistic determination of whether two
statutes are “on the same subject” based on whether the two
statutes originated from the same Congressional committee.
Because this is obviously a proposal rooted in and dependent on
the lawmaking process, I also address the ways in which changes
to the lawmaking process might affect the proposal.
I conclude with some reflections on the implications all this
has for statutory interpretation more broadly.
II. Statutes In Pari Materia
The in pari materia doctrine is one of numerous ways to
engage in interstatutory cross-referencing, to use one statute to
help understand another. When a court concludes that two
statutes are in pari materia, or (translating the Latin) “on the
same subject,” the court then treats the two statutes as though
they were one. 9 Provisions within the two statutes must thus be
harmonized. 10
9. See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (noting
that statutes addressing the same subject should be read “as if they were one
law”) (internal citations omitted).
10. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.2 (7th ed. 2019) (“[C]ourts try to construe [even]
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In applying the doctrine, courts tend to approach the project
of harmonization through one of two different lenses.
Traditionally, courts would harmonize to “make sense” of the two
statutes together. 11 In essence, this meant reconciling potentially
conflicting provisions so that each had independent meaning or
ensuring that the two statutes worked together in a coherent
fashion. Doing so would often entail some measure of policy
judgment. In recent years, however, with the rise of textualism as
a modality in statutory interpretation, the approach to
harmonization has at times taken on a more textualist tint. 12
Rather than harmonize to make policy sense of the two statutes
as a pragmatic matter, courts will now at times turn to linguistic
canons that they might have used to interpret within a
statute—canons such as the presumption of consistent usage or
arguments from negative implication (such as the expressio unius
canon 13)—to ensure that the two statutes are linguistically
coherent. 14 In essence, the idea is that “treating the two statutes
as one” means harmonizing them linguistically, rather than as a
policy matter. 15
My focus in this Article though will not be on how to apply
the in pari materia doctrine. The differing approaches to applying
the doctrine largely reflect the core differences in interpretive
methodology in general. Textualists view harmonization as a
process of linguistic harmonization, 16 while purposivists (or,
apparently conflicting statutes on the same subject harmoniously . . . .”).
11. See generally id.
12. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 424 (4th Cir. 2004),
rev’d, 546 U.S. 303 (2006), remanded, 445 F.3d 762 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“[A]pplication of the in pari materia canon reflects the judgment that Congress,
like other rational speakers, uses words consistently when speaking about
similar subjects, regardless of its generalized purposes.”).
13. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (“In English, it is known as the
negative-implication canon.”).
14. See, e.g., Teles AG v. Kappos, 846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111–14 (D.D.C.
2012) (using the expressio unius canon to ensure linguistic harmonization
between statutes interpreted in pari materia).
15. See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422 (applying the in pari materia
doctrine to conclude that the word “located” had to have the same meaning in
two different statutes).
16. As I explain in more detail below, textualists engage in linguistic
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perhaps, in this day and age, I should say “those judges who are
less wedded to a purely textualist modality”) 17 view
harmonization as part of a goal of policy coherence, coherence in
the real world that the two statutes inhabit. While this is of some
interest, it probably ranks as a footnote in the broader debate
about statutory interpretation.
Instead, I want to focus on the determination of whether two
statutes are in pari materia, what I will call the same-subject
determination or Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine. 18 It is
only after a court answers this question in the affirmative that
the court can then treat the two statutes as one and then use the
powerful tools of harmonization in the interpretive process.
The way in which courts make this determination tends to be
ad hoc and cursorily made, with little explanation. 19 Courts have
no analytical tools for determining when two statutes are on the
same subject. 20 Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
the determination is made intuitively and may well be made after
the judge has decided how the statute should ultimately be
interpreted. In other words, it seems likely that the
determination is not in fact one of the levers of decision, but is
instead a results-oriented fig leaf.
harmonization regularly, using linguistic canons such as the presumption of
consistent usage or the canon of meaningful variation. See infra Part II.A. The
phenomenon I address here is the determination of when a textualist should use
such a technique across statutes. See infra Part II.A.
17. See Harvard Law School, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://perma.cc/TK6F-X5X5 (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (claiming that every
current Supreme Court Justice is in some sense a textualist, something that
could not have been said before Justice Scalia joined the bench) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. With apologies to Professors Merrill and Hickman. See Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 912–14
(2001) (referring to the determination of whether Chevron applies as “Chevron
Step Zero”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006).
19. Cf. Widiss, supra note 6, at 872 (noting that “it can be difficult to guess
ex ante which statutes courts will determine to be ‘related’”).
20. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315–16 (2006)
(providing little guidance for determining whether statutes should be read in
pari materia aside from noting that subject-matter jurisdiction and venue are
not “concepts of the same order”).
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Whether I am right about this or not, the question the
same-subject determination asks a court to consider is a crucial
one in many interpretive disputes. Such disputes are, moreover,
staples of the statutory-interpretation canon and are, for good
reason, embedded in the pedagogy of statutory interpretation. 21
No good lawyer can ignore interstatutory interpretation. Yet,
scholars have largely ignored the question, perhaps in part
because the courts have been so lackadaisical when addressing it.
As I hope to show, however, the question is deeply
interesting from a jurisprudential standpoint and helps shed
light on important questions about the modern theory and
practice of statutory interpretation. By looking at this ancient
doctrine through the lens of modern modalities of statutory
interpretation, we can see aspects of the theories underlying
those modalities in a new light.
A. In Pari Materia Explained: How Courts Determine Whether
Two Statutes Are on “the Same Subject”
At its core, the in pari materia doctrine is less a doctrine and
more of an underlying principle, the notion that if two statutes
are on the same subject, they must cohere, they must harmonize.
One way to view the in pari materia doctrine then is as a
pragmatic tool that courts can use to make sense of an area of
law. 22
The Supreme Court’s explicit references to the in pari
materia doctrine have been few and far between, 23 but even in
21. See generally, e.g., CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 486–524
(2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 859–66 (5th ed. 2014); WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
857–69 (5th ed. 2009); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151–60 (2d ed. 2009).
22. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“The canon is . . . based
upon a realistic assessment of what the legislature ought to have
meant . . . . [T]he body of the law should make sense.”).
23. Since 1995, the Supreme Court has referenced the in pari materia
doctrine in only twenty-two cases. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–64 (2006) (“Given these linguistic differences, the
question here is not whether identical or similar words should be read in pari
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these few cases, one can see that the Court has no theoretical
framework, or even consistent approach, to the same-subject
determination. 24 Importantly, the Court has not even tried to
articulate a theoretical underpinning for the doctrine other than
that statutes on the same subject matter must cohere. 25 Though
some scholars have made arguments about specific cases or
aspects of the problem, 26 no one—whether on the Court, in
academia, or otherwise—has attempted to connect the
same-subject determination to the theories and modalities of
statutory interpretation.
Let us start with the Court’s most recent case addressing the
in pari materia doctrine, Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt. 27 In
materia to mean the same thing.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Estate of
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 531 (1998) (“[T]he priority act and the bankruptcy laws
‘were to be regarded as in pari materia, and both were unqualified; . . . as
neither contained any qualification, none could be interpolated.’” (quoting
Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 158
(1912))); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1996)
(applying former precedent to reapply the in pari materia doctrine (citing
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995))). As I noted,
however, the basic technique of interstatutory cross-referencing, including in
ways that amount to a use of the in pari materia doctrine, are widespread. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. Compare Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 315–16 (rejecting the in pari
materia doctrine’s application where matters were not sufficiently related), with
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 61–63 (refusing to use the in
pari materia doctrine due to differences in the language of the statute as a
whole).
25. Notably, Justice Scalia rests the doctrine on the principle that “the
body of the law should make sense.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252
(“It rests on two sound principles: (1) that the body of the law should make
sense, and (2) that it is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible
meanings of the text, to make it so.”). The cases confirm Justice Scalia’s
characterization. See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 136 (“Courts
serve the legislature’s purpose best by reading [the statute] to make sense and
avoid nonsense, and to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions composing a
coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the United States Code.”); see
generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 10, at § 51.2.
26. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the
Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can
Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 203
(2017) (arguing that, “[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary, consistency
presumptions should not be applied . . . across different statutes”).
27. 546 U.S. 303 (2006).
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Wachovia Bank, the Court unanimously held that a venue statute
was not in pari materia with a subject-matter jurisdiction
statute. 28 The Court’s reasoning, though, has little potential
applicability beyond the specific statutes it addressed. To see
why, the case is worth exploring in some detail.
Wachovia Bank involved a so-called “national bank” 29 that
brought a diversity action against South Carolina citizens in
federal court in South Carolina. 30 Wachovia’s main office was in
North Carolina, but it had branch offices in, among other places,
South Carolina. 31 The legal question was thus whether, for
diversity purposes, Wachovia was a citizen solely of North
Carolina where it had its main office, or also of all those other
places where it had branch offices. 32 If a national bank were
deemed to be a citizen of every state in which it has a branch
office, then Wachovia would be a citizen of (among other places)
South Carolina, and federal courts would thus not have
jurisdiction over any action against South Carolina citizens based
on diversity jurisdiction. 33
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a national bank’s
citizenship is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1348, which provides that
national banks are “deemed citizens of the States in which they
are respectively located.” 34 The question in Wachovia Bank thus
centered on the meaning of the word “located”: Is a national bank
“located” solely in the state where its main office resides or is it
also “located” in every state in which it has a branch office? 35 The
key problem, at least from an intentionalist, “faithful servant”
28. See id. at 316.
29. See id. at 306 (“[N]ational banks . . . [are] corporate entities chartered
not by any State, but by the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S. Treasury.”).
30. See id. at 308 (“[C]itizens of South Carolina sued Wachovia in a South
Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing them to participate in an
illegitimate tax shelter. . . . Wachovia [then] filed a petition [in federal
court] seeking to compel arbitration. . . . As the sole basis for federal-court
jurisdiction, Wachovia alleged the parties’ diverse citizenship.”).
31. See id. at 307.
32. See id. at 306–07.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018) (detailing the instances where federal
courts would have diversity jurisdiction over the parties).
34. Id. § 1348.
35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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approach to statutory interpretation, was that Congress clearly
did not contemplate the issue: when Congress adopted the
statute, interstate banking was not permitted and thus national
banks were not allowed to have branch offices in another state. 36
National banks were first authorized by Congress in 1863, 37 and
the relevant statutory language dated back to 1887, 38 with an
important predecessor statute that Congress had adopted in
1882. 39 Yet, Congress didn’t authorize national banks even to
have branches at all until the 1920s 40 and didn’t provide general
authorization for national banks to open branches in another
state until 1994, more than a century later. 41 Thus, when it
adopted the relevant language in the jurisdiction statute in the
nineteenth century, Congress clearly did not anticipate—indeed,
could not have anticipated—a national bank with branch offices
in another state. 42 The word “located” obviously referred to the
one state where the bank had its main office. 43 The jurisdiction
36. See Paul Lund, National Banks and Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2007) (“When Congress first authorized the
creation of national banks, they were not allowed to operate any branch
offices.”).
37. See id. at 76 (“Congress first authorized the creation of national banks
in 1863, at the height of the Civil War.”).
38. See id. at 81 (describing briefly the 1887 Act’s citizenship language).
39. See id. at 80–81 (“The 1882 Act provided that federal court jurisdiction
over suits involving national banks was to ‘be the same as, and not other than’
suits involving a state bank, thereby eliminating automatic federal question
jurisdiction over all cases to which a national bank was a party.”); Act of July
12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163.
40. See Christian A. Johnson & Tara Rice, Assessing a Decade of Interstate
Bank Branching, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 81 (2008) (“In 1922, . . . the [Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)] . . . permitted national banks to
establish branches only within their home city, provided, however, that a state
bank was permitted to operate branches within that city.”).
41. See generally Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339–43.
42. See Lund, supra note 36, at 107
Authorization of interstate branch banking by national banks was
still many years in the future at the time the statutory language now
found in [28 U.S.C. §] 1348 originated or even at the time of its most
recent recodification. Thus, the effect that branch banking would
create on national banks’ access to diversity jurisdiction could not
possibly have crossed Congress’s mind.
43. See id. at 82–83 (describing how few courts had analyzed the “located”
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statute was recodified in 1948, when at least some national banks
had branch offices, but even then, it did not matter for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction whether the word “located” meant just
where the bank’s main office was or encompassed all of its branch
offices too: either way, the bank was “located” in only one state.
The expansion of national banks to interstate banking thus
exposed what Professor Caleb Nelson has rightly referred to as a
latent ambiguity in the word “located,” one that did not exist at
the time of passage, either from a subjective or objective
perspective. 44
The Court concluded that, for jurisdictional purposes, a
national bank was “located” only where its designated main office
was. 45 Much of its reasoning is not important to me. What is
important though is its rejection of an argument based on the in
pari materia doctrine. The Fourth Circuit had concluded that a
national bank was “located” anywhere it had a branch office, and
it had relied in part on the fact that the Supreme Court had
previously interpreted the term “located” in a venue statute for
national banks “as encompassing any county in which a bank
The
very
same
maintains
a
branch
office.” 46
term—“located”—encompassed branch offices in the venue
statute, and so, the Fourth Circuit had reasoned, since the venue
statute and the jurisdiction statute were in pari materia, the
word “located” should have the same meaning in the jurisdiction
statute. 47 Importantly, for my purposes, the Fourth Circuit had
based its conclusion that the two statutes were in pari
materia—i.e., it had based the same-subject determination—on
the fact that “the jurisdiction and venue statutes pertain to the
language issue for most of the statute’s history because it had been a non-issue
prior to authorization of bank branching).
44. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 505 (stating that “from the standpoint of
the enacting Congress, the word ‘located’ . . . may have harbored a latent
ambiguity”).
45. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (“Reading
§ 1348 in this context, one would sensibly ‘locate’ a national bank
for . . . qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State designated in its
articles of association as its main office.”).
46. Id. at 313.
47. See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 418–20 (using the in pari materia
doctrine to construe “located” to mean wherever a bank has a branch).
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same subject matter, namely the amenability of national banking
associations to suit in federal court.” 48 Thus, the lower court
explicitly delineated a particular “subject matter,” one that on
first blush seems pretty narrow—“the amenability of national
banking associations to suit in federal court”—and then held that
both provisions—the venue provision and the jurisdiction
provision—were within that “subject matter.” 49 Only then did the
Fourth Circuit go on to conclude that the word “located” thus had
to have the same meaning in both statutes. 50 This is a classic
textualist approach to the in pari materia doctrine: where two
statutes are in pari materia, they must be treated as one
linguistically, and so the court can apply a linguistic canon across
the two statutes—here, the presumption of consistent usage.
Perhaps that is not the right way to apply the doctrine—perhaps
the court should have attempted to reconcile the policies of the
two statutes—but given how narrow the “subject matter” was, it
is hard to imagine rejecting the court’s same-subject
determination. Yet, the Supreme Court did . . . and did so
unanimously. 51
The Court concluded that the venue statute and the
jurisdiction statute were not in pari materia, despite both
statutes applying narrowly only to national banks. After noting
that, with respect to national banks in particular, the word
“located” was “a chameleon word,” sometimes meaning only the

48. Id. at 432.
49. See id. at 421–22
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of ‘located’ in Bougas controls the
meaning of ‘located’ in [§] 1348 . . . . Because the jurisdiction and
venue statutes pertain to the same subject matter, namely the
amenability of national banking associations to suit in federal court,
under the in pari materia canon the two statutes should be
interpreted as using the same vocabulary consistently to discuss this
same subject matter.
50. See id. at 423 (“Therefore, the two statutes should be treated as in pari
materia and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ‘located’ in Bougas must
control the meaning of the same term in [§] 1348.”); supra note 49 and
accompanying text regarding Bougas.
51. See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 315–16.
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bank’s main office and at other times including the branch
offices, 52 the Court held that
[v]enue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the
same order. Venue is largely a matter of litigational
convenience; accordingly, it is waived if not timely raised.
Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a
court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases;
a matter far weightier than venue, subject-matter jurisdiction
must be considered by the court on its own motion, even if no
party raises an objection. 53

Therefore, the Court concluded, the fact that it had previously
held that the word “located” encompassed branch offices in the
venue statute did not mean that it had to interpret “located” the
same way in the jurisdiction statute. 54
Despite concluding that the in pari materia doctrine did not
apply, however, the Court in effect went on to apply the
policy-coherence approach to the in pari materia doctrine. One
important policy rationale for why the term “located” in the venue
statute included all of the national bank’s branch offices, the
Court concluded, was treating national banks the same as
state-chartered banks and corporations. 55 In contrast, if the word
“located” in the jurisdiction statute included all of a national
bank’s branch offices, this would result in national banks having
far more limited access to federal court under diversity
jurisdiction than an ordinary corporation or state-chartered
52. See id. at 313–14, 318 (“To summarize, ‘located,’ as its appearances in
the banking laws reveal, . . . is a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the
context in and purpose for which it is used.”).
53. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
54. See id. at 319
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more
legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and
should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs through
legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against.
(quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)).
55. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]his Court’s reading of the venue provision in
Bougas effectively aligned the treatment of national banks for venue purposes
with the treatment of state banks and corporations.”).
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bank. 56 For diversity-jurisdiction purposes, an ordinary
corporation is a citizen only of the state in which it is
incorporated and the state of its principal place of business, at
most two, and often just one, state. 57 In contrast, if the word
“located” in the national bank jurisdiction statute included all of
a national bank’s branch offices, the bank would be a citizen of
multiple states—in Wachovia’s case, sixteen states—thereby
severely limiting a national bank’s access to federal court under
diversity jurisdiction. 58
In other words, despite the Court’s explicit rejection of the
argument that the venue statute and the jurisdiction statute
were in pari materia, we can see Wachovia Bank as in some sense
an application of the in pari materia doctrine. 59 The Court
effectively concluded that the two statutes both had a common
policy rationale, treating national banks the same as (or, at least
as similar as possible to) other corporations, and the word
“located” was to be interpreted in both statutes to further that
same policy goal. 60 Of course, this meant that the word “located”
meant different things in the two different statutes. 61 But still,
this sort of reasoning is an attempt to create policy coherence
56. See id. at 319 (“The resulting Fourth Circuit decision rendered national
banks singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access to
federal courts.”).
57. See id. at 318 (“[A] corporation’s citizenship derives, for diversity
jurisdiction purposes, from its State of incorporation and principal place of
business. It is not deemed a citizen of every State in which it conducts business
or is otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2018))).
58. See id. at 317 (“[W]hile corporations ordinarily rank as citizens of at
most 2 States, Wachovia, under the [Fourth Circuit’s] novel citizenship rule,
would be a citizen of 16 States.”).
59. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 502.
60. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (“Reading
§ 1348 in [the corporate citizenship] context, one would sensibly ‘locate’ a
national bank for the very same purpose, i.e., a qualification for diversity
jurisdiction in the State designated in its articles of association as its main
office.”).
61. Compare id. at 318–19 (finding the bank was “located” only “in the
State designated in its articles of association as its main office”), with Citizens &
S. Nat’l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 42–45 (1977) (determining that for
purposes of the venue statute, “located” meant all places in which a bank had
branches).
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across the two statutes—indeed, policy coherence between the
two statutes and those involving other corporations as well, an
even broader and deeper policy coherence—precisely what the in
pari materia doctrine has long been used to do. 62 Justice
Ginsburg’s conclusion that the two statutes were not in pari
materia reflected the framing of the application of the in pari
materia doctrine in terms of linguistic coherence, not policy
coherence. The assumption about how to apply the doctrine—that
it required linguistic coherence, as the Fourth Circuit had
held—thus shaped the logically preceding question, whether to
invoke the doctrine at all. If the Court had accepted that one can
apply the in pari materia doctrine as a tool of policy coherence,
then it easily could have found the venue and jurisdiction
statutes to be in pari materia and still come to the same result.
And it could have done so without narrowing the contours of the
concept of “subject matter” so much that venue and
jurisdiction—two areas that surely must be within the same
“subject matter”—end up being viewed as different “subject
matters.”
B. The Same-Subject Determination as an Instantiation of
Coherence in Law
At core, the in pari materia doctrine is based on an
underlying principle, the notion that if two statutes are on the
same subject, they must cohere, they must harmonize. 63 One way
to view the in pari materia doctrine then is as a pragmatic tool
that courts can use to make sense of an area of law. 64
Framed in these terms, it is not difficult to see the doctrine
as emblematic of a broader notion of pragmatism in legal
interpretation. The underlying assumption is that the law should

62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“[L]aws dealing with the
same subject—being in pari materia . . . —should if possible be interpreted
harmoniously.”).
64. See Newman Mem’l Hosp. v. Walton Constr. Co., 37 Kan. App. 2d 46, 68
(2007) (describing the in pari materia as a “pragmatic kind of test”).
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make sense; 65 harmonizing within an area of law would thus
simply be one way to make that area of law make more sense.
Thought of through the lens of “making sense” of the law, we can
see shades of modern-day Posnerian pragmatism. 66 Indeed, we
might even go further and see the in pari materia doctrine as an
instantiation of Dworkinian coherence 67 or the Legal Process
school’s notion that judges who do statutory interpretation must
fit new legislation into “the general fabric of the law.” 68 This
notion of coherence across law might be likened to T.S. Eliot’s
famous essay on art and tradition:
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone.
His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his
relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among
the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely
historical, criticism. The necessity that he shall conform, that
he shall cohere, is not onesided; what happens when a new
work of art is created is something that happens
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The
existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves,
which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really
new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete
before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the
supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if
ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions,
values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted;
and this is conformity between the old and the new. 69

65. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“[In pari materia] rests on
two sound principles: (1) that the body of law should make sense, and (2) that it
is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible meanings of the text,
to make it so.”).
66. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 59–96 (2003).
67. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 19 (1986) (“[J]udges should
construct a statute so as to make it conform as closely as possible to principles of
justice assumed elsewhere in the law.” (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189
(N.Y. 1889))); see generally POSNER, supra note 66.
68. See 4 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1416 (Tent. ed. 1958)
(referring to “the mode of fitting the statute into the general fabric of the law”).
69. T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in SELECTED ESSAYS
13, 15 (2d ed. 1951). See also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 141–42
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The idea of every piece of art both being shaped by the past and
in turn, almost paradoxically, shaping the past is directly
analogous to the idea that a statute “must be read,” as Judge
Friendly once put it, “as part of a continuum,” affecting both the
law that preceded it and the law that followed. 70
Coherence across statutes derives from the notion that every
statute connects not just with other statutes on the same subject,
but also with all other statutes as well as the common law. Its
origins are in a broader jurisprudential and historical notion of
coherence in the law, the notion that all law fits together in a
single coherent mass. 71 The in pari materia doctrine can thus be
viewed as something broader than its characterization and
categorization in the modern statutory-interpretation casebook:
(similarly noting that T.S. Eliot’s ideas about poets both “interpret[ing] and
through interpretation retrospectively shap[ing]” the tradition of poetry applies
more broadly to the interpretation of all texts, including law). I am indebted to
Professor Andrew Coan for drawing this analogy and directing me to the T.S.
Eliot essay.
70. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of
Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 214 (1967) (“[W]e must consult not only what
went before but what came after—the statute must be read as part of a
continuum.”). All this would of course appear to be anathema to modern-day
textualists, a point I will return to shortly. See infra Part IV.B.1. For now,
though, the important point is that coherence in the law and harmonization of
the law are the foundations of the in pari materia doctrine. See supra note 65
and accompanying text.
71. The cites on this are innumerable. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Coherence,
Holism, and Interpretation: The Epistemic Foundations of Dworkin’s Legal
Theory, 10 L. & PHIL. 383, 383 – 84 (1991) (“A legal system, [Dworkin] has
repeatedly argued, comprises not only the settled or conventionally identifiable
law, but also those norms which be shown to fit or cohere better with the best
theory of the settled law.”); Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 639, 641 (1993) (“In his article Legal Formalism, Weinrib claims
that his versions of conceptual coherence (and unity) are necessary for moral
legitimacy.” (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 952 (1988))). Attorney Ohlendorf provides
a recent example in the specific context of statutory interpretation. See John
David Ohlendorf, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 735, 738 (2014) (“[C]ourts have been led both to undervalue Congress’s
intent to impliedly repeal legislation and to place a thumb on the scale in favor
of displacement of federal common law out of a desire to make the total body of
law fit together as harmoniously as possible.”); cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 2,
at 238–41 (describing what the author refers to as “legal-landscape coherence”
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, contrasting it with “statute-specific
coherence”).
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Seen through this lens, the in pari materia doctrine is thus not
just a species of what Professor Popkin refers to as “statutory
patterns” 72 or what Professor Eskridge and co-authors refer to as
“interpretation in light of other statutes” 73 or as a “corollary” to
the Whole Act Rule. 74 Rather, the in pari materia doctrine can be
viewed as an example of the jurisprudential notion that all law is
part of one coherent whole, that all statutes and the common law
work together.
Seen through this lens then, the in pari materia doctrine
draws lines that determine, within the larger mass of law, those
sub-categories of law that really should cohere; perhaps it is
unrealistic to make all law cohere, the argument might go, 75 but
judges should at least do so within the confines of a single
“subject matter.” Importantly though, if this were indeed the
right way of thinking about the in pari materia doctrine, the
doctrine’s goal would be coherence—within the “subject matter,”
to be sure, but coherence nonetheless. Even in this more limited
sense, then, this goal has a Dworkinian feel to it and bears little
resemblance to what either subjective intentionalists or
textualists purport to seek—“Congressional intent” for
intentionalists or objective linguistic meaning for textualists. But
for those from the Legal Process School, one might see coherence
within a subject matter as simply a manifestation of Hart and
Sacks’ idea of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable goals
reasonably”: 76 We might assume, though without any specific
72. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 812–85 (5th ed. 2009) (addressing in pari
materia doctrine in chapter entitled “Statutory Patterns”); see also William D.
Popkin, Foreword: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 301 (1990).
73. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing
in pari materia doctrine in section entitled “Interpretation in Light of Other
Statutes”); see also NELSON, supra note 21, at 486 (same).
74. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 677 (including West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey in section of “Whole Act Rule” and its corollaries). For a
discussion of the Whole Act Rule, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
75. See generally, e.g., Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules,
Herbert and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730
(2000).
76. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
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evidence, that coherence between two statutes that are in pari
materia is what the legislature wants, policy sense rather than
policy nonsense. 77 This act of harmonization would of course often
entail some imaginative reconstruction, 78 since there will usually
not be any explicit evidence of legislative intent. Still, either with
an assumption of legislative reasonableness or a view about a
robust judicial role, one could treat the in pari materia doctrine
as a modern-day vestige of this historical notion of coherence in
the law: To determine whether two statutes are in pari materia is
simply to ask whether those two statutes belong together in a
single subcategory of the law that, as a normative matter, ought
to cohere.
As the world becomes more complex and law itself increases
in complexity, answering this question might become more
difficult, and the answers might change. For example, it could be
that as law expands, the subcategories become more and more
finely divided. For example, perhaps in the early nineteenth
century, the federal law of telecommunications (i.e., the law
regulating mail delivery) would have been in the same category
as, and should thus cohere with, the federal law of transportation
(the law regulating federal “roads,” which were often postal
roads). 79 Perhaps even in the late nineteenth century, some
aspects of the law of telecommunications—say the laws
regulating the telegraph—should cohere with some aspects of the
law of transportation—the laws regulating the railroads—since
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting that courts should “assume, unless
the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”).
77. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION 104 (2010) (“One reason for a court’s interpreting laws to
foster a coherent code is the assumption that the legislature would have wanted
it to do so.”).
78. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for
the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best described as one of
imaginative reconstruction.” (emphasis added)). This approach to statutory
interpretation asks an interpreter to “imagine how [members of the enacting
legislature] would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.” Id.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 7 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
establish post offices and post roads . . . .”).

198

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

telegraph lines were often built along railroad lines. 80 Yet, it was
probably no longer necessary for the entire field of
telecommunications law to cohere with the entire field of
transportation law. Indeed, in the United States, with its private
ownership of telegraph and its public ownership of the postal
service, it might not even have been necessary for the entire field
of telecommunications law to cohere. 81 And of course by the early
twenty-first century, with the law of transportation, at least
broadly speaking, including federal laws regulating motor vehicle
safety and fuel economy and local laws regulating traffic flow, it
is difficult to make a case that these laws ought to cohere with
telecommunications law writ large—or, as we now say,
“cyberlaw”—including the rules of e-commerce or net neutrality. 82
These are viewed as completely different “subject matters”
because of increased complexity in the world. In effect, a single
“subject matter” has subdivided into many. Indeed, even within
what could arguably be viewed as telecommunications law, it
would be hard to argue that all of such laws need to cohere—say
the applicability of state sales tax laws to out-of-state online
retailers versus the applicability of copyright law to uploaded
YouTube videos. 83 Amidst this constant change, in law and in the
80. See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION 164–67 (2010) (discussing 1875
National Telegraph Act and 1879 Butler Amendment allowing railroad
companies to own and operate telegraph lines along their rights-of-way).
81. See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office
and the Birth of Communication Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 577–84 (2007)
(describing differences in privacy protections between postal and telegraphic
communications).
82. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (instructing the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate motor vehicle fuel economy standards), and CAL.
VEH. CODE § 21101 (Deering 1998) (providing for local regulation of highways),
with Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (imposing “limitations and
penalties on the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail via the
Internet”), and In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311
(2017) (rescinding net neutrality).
83. Compare South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099–2100
(2018) overturning Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that
states may impose a sales tax on internet sales by out-of-state retailers with no
physical presence in the state), with Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d
19, 37 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
intermediary liability provisions to YouTube videos).
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world, there can thus be no Archimedean point for determining
when two statutes are in pari materia.
Key, though, is that, seen through this lens, the question
that Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine asks is a normative
question about whether two statutes ought to cohere. It has
nothing to do with specific legislative intent or the objective
meaning of words. On its face, then, the same-subject
determination bears little connection with either the
intentionalist or the textualist modality in statutory
interpretation.
C. The Same-Subject Determination as a Delineation of the
“Context” Surrounding Statutory Language
While we can thus think of the in pari materia doctrine as
simply a hollowed-out relic of the idea of all law as one coherent
jurisprudential mass, we can also look at it from the smallest
units of law outwards rather than from the mass of law inward.
Rather than thinking of a theoretical construct of all law
subdivided into those categories that should be internally
coherent, we can instead think of the in pari materia doctrine
through the lens of the specific text of a statute, asking what else
other than that text can be used as evidence of the statute’s
meaning. In other words, we can think of the same-subject
determination as drawing boundaries around the statutory text:
within those boundaries lies the statute’s “context,” which the
judge may of course consider when interpreting the statute. 84
To illustrate the point, consider a simple, well-known
example from the statutory-interpretation canon: the use of the
Whole Act Rule when interpreting the words “labor” and “service”
in the statute at issue in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States. 85 In Holy Trinity, the Court had to determine whether a
84. Cf. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 51.01 at 172 – 73 (6th ed. 2000) (“The principle that statutes in pari materia
should be construed together is a variation of the principle that all parts of a
statute should be construed together and its corollary that an amendment and
the unchanged portion of the original act should be construed together.”).
85. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

200

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

church that had hired and then prepaid the transportation costs
of a minister, E. Walpole Warren, to come from England to New
York violated a statutory prohibition on “assist[ing] or
encourag[ing] the importation or migration[] of any alien to
perform labor or service of any kind.” 86 The court quickly
“conceded that the act of the [church] is within the letter of this
section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service,
and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the
other.” 87 But as many commentators have pointed out, the terms
“labor” and “service” could have multiple meanings, and it is not
difficult to find dictionary meanings of the terms that would limit
their reach to manual work. 88 If so, “the relation of rector to his
church” would, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, not be “one of
service” and would not “impl[y] labor.” After all, the term “labor”
is etymologically connected with the term “laborer,” and no one
would view Reverend Warren as a “laborer.” 89 And the term
“service” is etymologically connected with the term “servant,”
which again is a far cry from anyone’s idea of a minister. 90 Of
course, these are by no means the only possible definitions of
“labor” and “service,” but they are plausible. It is thus possible in
the abstract to argue, contrary to Justice Brewer’s concession
86. Id. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332).
87. Id.
88. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 40
(2016) [hereinafter MISREADING LAW] (noting that the “prototypical” meaning of
“labor” would have been manual labor); Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain
Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 998 (2011) [hereinafter Two Kinds] (arguing
that the Court dismissed a clear plain meaning in favor of Congressional
intent); SOLAN supra note 77, at 54–55 (distinguishing between the “ordinary”
meaning, which would be manual labor, and the broader “definitional”
meaning); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit,
Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 924–30
(2000) (in support of a more limited definition of “labor” in Holy Trinity, noting
that “labor” as used in Chinese Exclusion Act meant manual labor).
89. See, e.g., Labor, 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d. ed. 1989)
(“labor” defined as “Bodily or mental exertion, particularly when difficulty,
painful, or compulsory; (hard) work; toil, esp. physical toil”); id. (“laborer”
defined as “[a] person who performs physical labour, usually as a means of
employment; a manual worker, esp. one carrying out unskilled work”).
90. See, e.g., Service, 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 34 (2d. ed. 1989)
(“service” defined as “[t]he condition of being a servant; the fact of serving a
master”).
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“that the act of the [church] is within the letter” of the law, that
the terms are ambiguous as to whether they apply to the church’s
hiring of its pastor: one possible meaning of “labor” and “service”
would encompass what the Court referred to as “brain toilers”
such as Reverend Warren, and another possible meaning would
exclude them. Where terms are ambiguous and an interpreter
must choose among different possible definitions, most judges,
even some modern-day textualists, are willing to turn to
statutory purpose. Given the evidence about the statute’s
purpose, it wouldn’t have been hard to argue that limiting “labor”
and “service” to their manual-work definitions was appropriate.
But when confronted with such an approach to
interpretation, virtually every first-year law student can see the
flaw in the reasoning. But the flaw is found not in the words
“labor” and “service,” nor even in Section 1 of the Act 91—the
statutory prohibition—at all. Rather, the flaw in arguing for
narrow definitions of “labor” and “service” is that elsewhere—in
Section 5 of the Act 92—the statute includes exceptions for “actors,
artists, lecturers, [and] singers,” exceptions that—or, so the
argument goes—simply would not have been necessary if “labor”
and “service” were meant to be limited to the narrow definition of
manual work. 93 This is of course a straightforward negative
implication argument from context: The context surrounding
Section 1 of the statute—namely, the exceptions in Section
5—tells us something about the most likely meaning of the words
“labor” and “service” in Section 1. 94 But of course, one reason
context matters here is that virtually everyone agrees that
Section 1 and Section 5 must cohere, that it would be wrong to
interpret the words “labor” and “service” in Section 1 without
taking into account Section 5 and its exceptions. 95 An interpreter
91. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332.
92. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 5, 23 Stat. 332.
93. But see MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at 46 (arguing that the
exceptions support the view that “labor” was meant to be limited to manual
labor because Congress meant to clarify, not limit the broad category).
94. See Two Kinds, supra note 88, at 998 (noting that the court used the
Section 5 exceptions to further demonstrate that Congress intended the statute
to mean “labor” and “service” in a broad sense of employment, rather than
manual labor).
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seeks to harmonize these two sections, and to do so, concludes
that the inclusion of “actors, artists, lecturers, [and] singers” as
exceptions listed in Section 5 would be superfluous if the terms
“labor” and “service” in Section 1 were limited to manual work. 96
This argument likely appeals to both intentionalists and
textualists. A subjective intentionalist would say that ensuring
coherence between Sections 1 and 5 makes sense because the
drafter of Section 1 also drafted Section 5—they are, after all,
part of the same statute adopted at the same time. 97 The
textualist would likewise say Section 5 is crucial to
understanding the meaning of Section 1 but would focus on the
objective meaning that the “objectively reasonable” reader would
glean from the text. 98 But why exactly does Section 5 matter at
all to the textualist when interpreting Section 1? The answer is
that the textualist expects the objective reader to look at and
consider statutory context. 99 The objective reader is expected to
know what is usually referred to as the Whole Act Rule (or at
least some variation on it—more on this point below). 100 She or he
95. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 167 (“Sir Edward Coke
explained the [Whole Act] canon in 1628: ‘[I]t is the most natural and genuine
exposition of a statute to construe one part of the statute by another part of the
same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.” (quoting 1
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OR A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 728 (14th ed. 1791))).
96. Notice that this is distinct from an expressio unius argument based on
the fact that ministers are not included in the list of exceptions.
97. But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–35 (2013) (noting
that the “rule against superfluities” does not comport with how most drafters
understand the meaning of texts because drafters often include redundancy to
satisfy audiences other than judicial interpreters).
98. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 170–73 (describing
the presumption of consistent usage which presumes that when a word is used
more than once in a text, the meanings are consistent).
99. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 167 (“Context is a primary
determinant of meaning. A legal instrument typically contains many
interrelated parts that make up the whole. The entirety of the document thus
provides the context for each of its parts.”).
100. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2005) (discussing the Whole Act Rule and its application in a variety of cases in
depth). Justice Scalia referred to the Whole Act Rule as the “whole-text canon.”
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knows that you have to look beyond a specific statutory provision
to understand that provision, that you need to read the entire
statute. 101 The argument might on first blush seem circular, and
at some level it is: a reader who goes straight to the dictionary
and finds the manual-work definitions of “labor” and “service”
and interprets Section 1 on that basis alone simply does not
understand enough about statutes to be deemed the appropriate
objective reader.
From the textualist’s perspective, then, one important
preliminary consideration is understanding what the objective
reader should know. 102 Or, more precisely, what else other than
the immediate text the objective reader must look to in order to
understand the meaning of that text? What is within the relevant
context that an objective interpreter should be expected to look
at? My example from Holy Trinity 103 is easy: there, no one doubts
the relevance of Section 5 for interpreting Section 1.
As I will explain in more detail in Part III, though, this point
becomes crucial when we seek to determine whether two statutes
are in pari materia. For a textualist, one key to determining
when one statute is in pari materia with a second should be
determining when an objective reader would or should look to
that second statute. While this question does not answer itself by
any means, it does create a more objective approach to the
problem. It also serves textualism’s goals of cabining judicial
discretion and its rule-of-law value of fair notice. As we will see
when I address some examples in Part III, this approach
precludes the interpreter who might claim textualism’s mantle
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Dig. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018)
(determining that the definitions section of a statute must control when
interpreting statutory language); accord Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700–01 (1995) (looking to a provision in
Endangered Species Act that authorized Secretary of Interior to issue permits
for takings to help interpret the word “harm” in the definition of the word “take”
in the same statute); id. at 722–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (similarly looking to
other provisions in the Endangered Species Act to interpret the same word).
102. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 16 (“In their full context, words
mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were
written . . . .”).
103. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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from engaging in a freewheeling romp through the United States
Code to find helpful references to make arguments based on, say,
the presumption of consistent usage or, as in Holy Trinity, based
on negative implications such as the presumption against
superfluity. As I explained earlier, what textualists are likely to
do once they determine that two statutes are in pari materia is
different from what subjective internationalists are likely to do, 104
but that is of less concern to me here. Here, I am focused simply
on the question of how to determine whether two statutes are in
pari materia.
Before turning to some examples, though, I want to touch
briefly on the question of whether it makes sense for two statutes
ever to be deemed in pari materia. Why should an interpreter
ever look outside the four corners of the specific statute being
interpreted? The answer is obvious to anyone who has done any
interpretation, including textualists: 105 Law does not spring forth
into being like Athena from the head of Zeus. 106 All law—indeed,
all language—is painted on a pre-existing canvas that consists of
not just background principles of how to interpret, 107 and not just
ordinary uses of language, but also pre-existing law. The in pari
materia doctrine is just one example, then, of a broader set of
questions about how an interpreter is to grapple with the rest of
the law. Everyone—textualist and intentionalist alike—considers
the fact that a statute is not an isolated document. The question
the in pari materia doctrine raises is a subset of the broader
question of what else—in particular, what other statutes—the
interpreter should view as relevant context in the interpretive
process. 108
104. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text; see also NELSON, supra
note 21, at 487.
105. See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608–17 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (textualist Justice looking outside four corners of
statute to draw on history, context and canons of interpretation to interpret
statutory language).
106. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 29 (1950) (detailing the birth of
Athena from Zeus’s head).
107. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 1–5 (discussing background “principles of
interpretation”).
108. I should be clear that I am distinguishing between drawing on another
statute as evidence of the use of the English language and drawing on another
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III. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Textualist
Modality 109 in Statutory Interpretation
A. Textualism, Linguistic Theory, and the Objective Reader
Textualism is an approach to statutory interpretation that,
as its name suggests, focuses on the text of a statute as the
principal—in many cases, sole—factor in interpreting a
statute. 110 Textualism comes in lots of related flavors, but the
statute as evidence of the specific meaning of the statute being interpreted. The
in pari materia doctrine uses another statute as evidence of the specific meaning
of a statute and not merely as evidence of the use of the English language. If
used as evidence of the way language is used generally, cross-referencing some
other statute would be no different from citing Shakespeare or Dickens or the
Bible. Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–31 (1998) (using
dictionaries, the Bible, famous writings, recent media coverage and case law to
demonstrate the meaning of “carry” in the context of firearms), with id. at
143–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries,
surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell us, dispositively, what ‘carries’ means
embedded in [the statute].”). Such a use could presumably be subject to work on
the corpus of language that has become all the rage in interpretation these days.
See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127
YALE L.J. 788, 795 (2018) (“Corpus linguists study language through data
derived from large bodies—corpora—of naturally occurring language.”). But, the
in pari materia doctrine’s use of cross-referenced statutes is a different
phenomenon. It relies on the similarity in subject matter and the fact that the
cross-reference is another statute, not just some other random use of language,
to argue that the cross-referenced, related statute is better evidence of specific
usage in the particular statutory context, rather than evidence of general
linguistic usage. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. I am indebted to
Professor Christopher Robertson for helping me clarify this important
distinction.
109. I borrow the term “modality” here from the literature on constitutional
interpretation. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (describing six modalities of constitutional argument:
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical). It strikes me
as a more apt term. Cf. John David Ohlendorf, Purposivism Outside Statutory
Interpretation, 21 TEXAS REV. L. & POL. 235, 270 (2016) (“The idea is that a
variety of considerations—text, structure, consequences, precedent, deeply held
values —all get folded into a robust, wide-ranging balancing process, with the
ultimate contribution of each modality to the final conclusion left ‘to the realm of
judgment.’” (citing Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?,
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 167 (2008))).
110. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 16 (“Textualism, in its purest
form, begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”).
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core commonality that all textualists share is that the text comes
first and foremost and that the language of the statute must take
precedence over other evidence of either Congress’s subjective
intent or its purpose. 111 While textualists thus generally refuse to
rely on either legislative history or any alleged purpose
unexpressed in enacted statutory text, many will look to
normative or substantive canons (such as the rule of lenity112 or
presumption against the abrogation of sovereign immunity 113)
where such a canon might be relevant. The normative canons,
though, are not the core of the textualist modality. Rather, the
core of the textualist modality is to use linguistic tools to
determine what legal theorists refer to as the statute’s
“communicative content.” 114 Importantly, textualists often
interpret statutes by determining the “plain meaning” of a

111. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 18
Nontextualism, which frees the judge from interpretive scruple,
comes in various forms. Perhaps the nontextualists’ favorite
substitute for text is purpose. . . . [P]urposivism . . . facilitates
departure from text in several ways. Where purpose is king, text is
not—so the purposivist goes around or behind the words of the
controlling text to achieve what he believes to be the provision’s
purpose. Moreover, purpose is taken to mean the purpose of the
author (the legislature or private drafter)—which means that all
sorts of nontextual material such as legislative history . . . becomes
relevant to revise the fairest objective meaning of the text. The most
destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism is
manipulability.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (using the
rule of lenity to interpret a statutory ambiguity).
113. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29–45 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Pennsylvania’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act).
114. See Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235,
1266 – 67 (2015) (“[Professor] Solum equates the centrally relevant sense of
linguistic meaning with what he calls ‘communicative content,’ which he regards
as a function of semantic meaning and the contextual facts that give rise to
what philosophers of language call ‘pragmatic enrichment.’” (citing Lawrence B.
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
484 (2013))).
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statute’s language based on how an objective reader would
understand the text. 115
The textualist’s claim to reject subjective intent and focus
only on an “objectified intent” 116 is an attempt to shift the focus of
statutory interpretation from writer to reader, to draw the
distinction between, in linguists’ terms, “‘speaker’s meaning’ and
‘sentence meaning’ (or ‘expression meaning’).” 117 As Professor
Solum articulates the distinction, “speaker’s meaning should be
analyzed in terms of a speaker’s (or author’s) intentions.” 118 In
contrast, “[t]he sentence meaning (or ‘expression meaning’) of an
utterance is the conventional semantic meaning of the words and
phrases that combine to form the utterance.” 119 The idea of
“sentence meaning” is premised on the notion that “words and
expressions have standard meanings—the meanings that are
conventional given relevant linguistic practices.” 120 In short,
textualism aims to capture what the linguists call “sentence
meaning.” Traditionally, textualists viewed the process of
determining meaning through the lens of what Justice Scalia
referred to as “objectified intent,” and this process was thought to
be based on the perspective of the statutory reader. 121
B. Textualism’s Rationales and the Same-Subject Determination
As either a theory or a modality of statutory interpretation,
textualism itself provides no inherent answer to the question of
115.
116.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (stating that “objectified intent” is
“the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law”); see
also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 33 (“The interpretive approach we
endorse is that of the ‘fair reading’: determining the application of a governing
text to the given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent
in the language, would have understood the test at the time it was issued.”).
117. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 489–90 (2013) (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY
OF WORDS 3–143 (1989)).
118. Id. at 490.
119. Id. at 491.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 116.
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when it is appropriate to rely on one statute to interpret
another. 122 When a textualist decides it is appropriate, the
textualist will of course use linguistic canons, such as the
presumptions of consistent usage or meaningful variation, across
the two statutes. 123 Yet, as we saw in Wachovia Bank, even
textualists will treat the appropriateness of relying on a second
statute to interpret a statute as an in pari materia question. 124
In practice, then, everyone—including textualists—
understands that the so-called Whole Code Rule in statutory
interpretation, if taken literally, is far too broad to work
consistently in practice: There is no way to create complete
linguistic consistency across the entire United States Code. 125
The array of different laws in the U.S. Code is just too large to
demand linguistic coherence across the entire code. 126 On the
122. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read
a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 477 (2012) (explaining that
textualists do rely on, among other things, other statutes in the interpretive
process).
123. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV.
419, 434–36 (2005) (explaining that textualists employ linguistic canons as they
interpret statutes).
124. See supra Part II.A; see also Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414,
422–23 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J.) (determining the meaning of a statute
through the canon of in pari materia), rev’d, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). Judge Luttig, a
prominent textualist, wrote the Fourth Circuit opinion finding the two statutes
were in pari materia. Id. at 415. Justice Scalia joined the unanimous Supreme
Court decision finding that the two statutes were not in pari materia. See
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). Neither of them thought the
word “located” necessarily had to have the same meaning in both statutes. See
id. at 316–19 (discussing whether “located” should have the same meaning in
both statutes); Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422–24 (same). Both recognized that
at least sometimes statutes do not have to cohere linguistically. See Wachovia
Bank, 546 U.S. at 314 (“Congress’ use of the two terms may be best explained as
a coincidence of statutory codification.”); Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422–23
(addressing variety of circumstances in which words in different statutes do not
cohere linguistically).
125. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 122, at 477 (discussing the decision costs of
interpreting a statute in the context of the entire U.S. Code); cf. Buzbee, supra
note 1, at 232, 237–39 (arguing that allowing courts to reference statues
throughout the code provides judges too much discretion).
126. See Gluck, supra note 26, at 202–04 (explaining that features of the
legislative process “pose a perhaps insurmountable obstacle” to the assumption
that linguistic consistency exists “across an entire statute or . . . even across
multiple statutes”). This may be one reason why the Dictionary Act, the U.S.
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other hand, everyone—including textualists—will at times
engage in interstatutory cross-referencing, thereby recognizing
that the context for interpretation sometimes includes statutes
other than the one being interpreted. 127 This thus leads to the
fundamental question that Step Zero of the in pari materia
doctrine raises: how should a textualist judge determine whether
the statute to be interpreted—let us call it “Statute A”—is “on the
same subject” as the statute being compared—let us call it
“Statute B”?
The question then is, how should a textualist draw the
demarcation lines of subject matter in a principled way? We can
look to the animating rationales underlying textualism, as those
reasons can help us understand how to determine what
constitutes the same subject. Or, at the very least, how to
determine what factors we might use when inquiring as to
whether two statutes are on the same subject.
Textualists rely on several rationales for textualism,
although these rationales tend to be used for specific aspects of
the debate between textualists and their opponents, rather than
as a full-throttled defense of textualism per se: some are used to
defend “plain meaning,” 128 others are used to oppose the use of
legislative history, 129 and others are used to defend the use of
linguistic canons like the presumption of consistent usage or
Code’s definition section, provides that its definitions apply “unless the context
indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony,
506 U.S. 194, 199–200 (1993) (employing the “context” clause in the Dictionary
Act to interpret a statutory term contrary to the Dictionary Act definition). As
we will see, whether to aspire for consistency across the entire U.S. Code
remains a crucial question when addressing the broader question of
interstatutory cross-referencing. See infra Part III.D.
127. See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422 (employing interstatutory
cross-referencing through the canon of in pari materia). Again, let me
emphasize that I refer here to relying on another statute based on the notion
that the specific usage in that other statute provides better evidence of the
meaning of the statute’s language than evidence of English language usage
generally. See supra note 108 (discussing this distinction).
128. See David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1565, 1565 (1997) (“The basic idea—that the interpretation of a statute begins
by considering the ordinary meaning of its words—seems obviously right.”).
129. See Manning, supra note 123, at 420 (“[M]any textualist judges
typically refuse to treat legislative history as ‘authoritative’ . . . .”).
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substantive canons like the rule of lenity. 130 Broadly speaking
though, the principal arguments fall into four categories: (1) text
as enacted law; 131 (2) decision costs/efficiency; 132 (3) judicial
constraint; 133 and (4) notice. 134
The first two rationales provide little help in determining
whether two statutes are in pari materia. First, the argument
that only the text is enacted law does not help determine whether
two statutes are on the same subject. For some textualist judges
and scholars, the argument has some purchase on the
appropriateness of using legislative history. 135 For many, it also
130. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13 (including not only
“semantic” and “syntactic” canons, but also “expected-meaning” canons such as
the presumption against extraterritoriality, “government-structuring” canons
such as the presumption against federal preemption, and “private-right” canons
such as the rule of lenity).
131. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1287, 1304–07 (2010) (explaining a shift in textualism that resulted in it
having a “more formal, constitutionally grounded cast”).
132. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (arguing that judges
should generally stick close to text because of uncertainty and bounded
rationality).
133. See SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17–18 (explaining that a non-textualist
approach allows judges to interpret a statute based on “their own objectives and
desires”). A variation of this argument is that textualism creates more
predictable interpretive results, which in turn facilitates better legislative
drafting, a variation on what Hart and Sacks famously referred to as the
“flagellant theory of statutory interpretation.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 91 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). There remains
an open question as to whether the practice of textualism, with its multiple
linguistic and substantive canons, actually does a better job at limiting judicial
discretion than competing theories. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Change,
Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon
Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2018) (based on
an extensive study of the Roberts Court’s use of interpretive canons, concluding
that predictability and stability cannot justify use of the canons).
134. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 352
(2005) (explaining that textualists focus on the reasonable meaning of the text
due to the belief that “people should not be held to legal requirements of which
they lacked fair notice”).
135. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 90–91 (2017) (arguing that the use of
legislative history is “illegitimate” because it is “insufficient to constitute
legislation in our system of governance”).
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dovetails with the idea, rooted in public choice theory, that
legislation is the product of interest group politics and that judges
should honor the bargain embedded in the text. 136 Neither of
these ideas provides help on the question here. All statutes are
enacted law, and, if public-choice theory reflects the legislative
process, all are the product of interest group politics. This fact
tells us little about the same-subject determination because that
determination is about the relationships among statutes, since it
asks which statutes are “on the same subject” (and thus which
statutes can be relied on as a source of interpretive aid). While
the argument that only the text is enacted law may bear on the
relevance of legislative history, it has nothing to say about the
same-subject determination.
Second, although the argument that textualism reduces
decision costs (an argument that probably has far more purchase
in the trial courts than in the U.S. Supreme Court) 137 does have
something to say about the proper scope of the same-subject
determination, it has little to say about the content of that
determination. Reducing decision costs as a rationale would
support a more limited in pari materia doctrine, perhaps even the
elimination of the doctrine altogether. After all, the further afield
an interpreter may look for aid in interpreting a statute, the
greater the potential costs of decision. This rationale for
textualism favors plain meaning and a focus on the four corners
of the document, 138 but with as limited a conception of the
relevant “document” as possible: the further afield the interpreter
may go, the more context the interpreter may consider, and thus
136. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 296–97
(1988) (noting that Easterbrookian textualism embodies public choice ideals and
“provides one useful way to limit rent-seeking legislation”).
137. See Bruhl, supra note 122, at 470–73 (positing that resource disparities
among different levels of courts should affect the appropriateness of using
different techniques of statutory interpretation); see also Anuj C. Desai,
Heterogeneity, Legislative History, and the Cost of Litigation: A Brief Comment
on Bruhl’s “Hierarchy and Heterogeneity”, 2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2013)
(noting that to evaluate Bruhl’s normative claim, we first need answers to
certain empirical questions).
138. See VERMEULE, supra note 132, at 4 (asserting that judges should “stick
close to the surface-level or literal meaning of clear and specific texts”).
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the higher the decision costs. But the decision-costs rationale
does not help an interpreter decide whether two statutes are in
fact in pari materia. If we are going to have an in pari materia
doctrine at all, textualist judges need tools for determining when
two statutes are “on the same subject.”
Third, the argument that textualism limits judicial discretion
can help us understand the in pari materia question in a limited
sense, but it is one that is crucial to my proposed approach: if
limiting judicial discretion is an important goal of statutory
interpretation, it counsels for a more rule-like approach for
determining what constitutes statutes on the same subject,
rather than one based on standards. Rules tend to limit decision
maker authority more than standards. 139 Again though, as with
the rationale from decision costs, the judicial-constraint
argument for textualism does not tell us anything about what the
content of the rule should be. 140
It is the final rationale for textualism though, the argument
based on the principle of notice, that can help with the content of
such a rule. Much of what drives textualism is the notion that it
is simply unfair to regulate citizens without providing proper
notice. 141 Those subject to the law should know what the law is
and should only be subject to the objective understanding of the
law as promulgated and not to the subjective understanding or
intentions of the legislators. 142
139. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992) (“any rule reduces judicial discretion as compared
with a standard”); Nelson, supra note 134, at 375 (“A more ‘rule-like’ principle or
directive will itself incorporate some advance judgments . . . [,] generalizations
that the implementing officials might think unfounded in a particular case, but
that they are nonetheless supposed to accept.”).
140. Professor William Buzbee has argued that an open-ended approach to
statutory cross-referencing permits judges too much discretion. See Buzbee,
supra note 1, at 232, 237–39. While I wholeheartedly agree, my point here is
somewhat different. To the extent that any statutory cross-referencing is to be
allowed, a rule-like approach will serve as more of a constraint than one based
on standards.
141. See Nelson, supra note 134, at 352 (stating that textualists
“emphasiz[e] . . . that people should not be held to legal requirements of which
they lacked fair notice”).
142. See id. (explaining the connection between textualism’s focus on fair
notice and the importance of objective understanding).
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Many textualists view this important value as crucial to the
relationship between lawmakers and citizens. 143 On this view,
statutory interpretation must emphasize plain meaning because
such an approach allows the ordinary person to understand the
law. 144 It is thus the reader of the law whose understanding
prevails over the lawmakers’. 145 Textualists’ focus on the reader
of the law rather than the drafter of the law is imbued too with
what I elsewhere refer to as textualism’s Benthamite strand: 146 it
143. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
I likewise cannot join the Court’s discussion of the (as usual,
inconclusive) legislative history. Relying on the statement of a single
Member of Congress or an unvoted-upon (and for all we know unread)
Committee Report to expand a statute beyond the limits its text
suggests is always a dubious enterprise. And consulting those
incunabula with an eye to making criminal what the text would
otherwise permit is even more suspect. Indeed, it is not unlike the
practice of Caligula, who reportedly “wrote his laws in a very small
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually
to ensnare the people.”
(citations omitted). See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (making the same point, but referring to
Nero, not Caligula: “It is said that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to
post his edicts high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and
easier to transgress.”); SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17 (after criticizing the view
that the meaning of a law should be determined by what the lawgiver meant,
stating, “That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was
said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not
easily be read”). Justice Scalia’s historical claim about Caligula likely comes
from Blackstone. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 (14th ed. 1803)
(noting that law must be notified “in the most public and perspicuous manner;
not like Caligula who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small
character, and hung them upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the
people”).
144. See Scalia, supra note 143, at 1179 (“Rudimentary justice requires that
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”).
145. See SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17 (explaining the importance of
meaning as the ordinary reader would understand it rather than a lawmaker).
146. See Anuj C. Desai, Textualism Step Zero (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (explaining the importance of
Bentham’s ideas about simplicity in law); see also Dean Alfange, Jr., Jeremy
Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 61 (1969) (noting
that Bentham “was dedicated to the belief that justice, order, certainty and
simple procedure could be implanted permanently into any legal system through
the adoption of a comprehensive but concise legal code”).
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is the ordinary person’s understanding of the text that must
prevail over the unknowable and, even if knowable, unadopted
legislative intent. 147
Textualists understand though that such a focus on the
statutory reader requires the positing of an “objectively
reasonable” person, from whose position the statute must be
understood. 148 Determining who exactly that “objectively
reasonable” person is may not, however, be a simple task. 149
Professor Nelson has, with characteristic insight, used a slightly
different term from the term “objectively reasonable person” to
describe a textualist’s typical statutory reader: Nelson refers to
the “‘appropriately informed’ interpreter.” 150 The use of the term
“appropriately informed” interpreter rather than “objectively
reasonable” person allows for a subtle shift away from the
ordinary person as objective reader, at least (or so I will argue) as
to certain types of laws. 151
Indeed, in a world where law is such a complex phenomenon,
the notice rationale by itself simply cannot answer all questions
of statutory interpretation. 152 As most textualists recognize, at
least implicitly, much law is not aimed at all citizens. 153 Thus, to
147. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint,
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 751–52 (2017) (explaining that Justice Scalia believed
that a judge should rely on the enacted text over legislative intent).
148. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 91–92 (2017) (explaining that the text’s
meaning lies in the “reaction of the contemporaneous interpretive community”);
cf. NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 131 (2019) (referring to
“an ordinary English speaker familiar with the law’s usages”).
149. See Nelson, supra note 134, at 357 (framing the analysis of who
constitutes the appropriate reader).
150. See id. at 353 (explaining that the “‘appropriately informed’ interpreter”
is “someone who knows what interpreters are permitted to know and who will
use that information for the purposes that interpreters are permitted to use it”).
151. See infra Part III.C.2.
152. See Easterbrook, supra note 148, at 82 (“[E]ven textualism . . . does not
have an algorithm.”).
153. Justice Gorsuch has explicitly claimed to be picking up Justice Scalia’s
mantle, including on the question of the ordinary person as a reader of law. See,
e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1123–35 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part) (adopting Justice Scalia’s articulation of the notice rationale
for textualism); Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743,
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understand how the notice principle might shed light on the in
pari materia question requires a deeper understanding of, using
Nelson’s term, who the “appropriately informed” interpreter is.
Put another way, to answer the in pari materia question, a
textualist must first identify the statute’s audience. 154
At core, then, to effectuate the notice principle requires an
understanding of a statute’s audience, or to borrow Professor
William Blatt’s phrase, the statute’s “interpretive community.” 155
This insight can help us understand how to draw lines for
purposes of the in pari materia doctrine. In particular, a key
principle underlying a textualist approach to whether two
statutes are on the same subject ought to be whether the
audiences of the two statutes are the same. 156 Put another way,
two statutes are on the same subject if the “appropriately
informed” reader—the audience—is the same. Another way to
formulate this question is to ask whether those in the audience of
the statute being interpreted—what I am calling “Statute
A”—would know about “Statute B,” the statute that might or
748 (2014) (favorably drawing on Justice Scalia’s reference to Caligula
“publishing the law in a hand so small and posted so high no one could be sure
what was and wasn’t forbidden. (No doubt, all the better to keep everyone on
their toes. Sorry . . . .”)). Yet, even he will interpret words in a way that no
ordinary reader could possibly have been able to do, at least without an
extensive knowledge of English common law. See Artis v. District of Columbia,
138 S. Ct. 594, 610 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word “toll”
in light of common law); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 320–21.
154. This may well be true not just when determining a textualist approach
to the in pari materia question, but also when applying textualism more
generally. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 n.43 (1989) (noting that the notion of the
“objectively reasonable person” simply “begs the question” of what that person
knows); see also Desai, supra note 146 (explaining the importance of the
statute’s audience in determining meaning); David Louk, The Audiences of
Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (same).
155. See William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in
Statutory Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 629 (2001) (“The shared
understanding of [a text’s] readers constitutes the ‘interpretive community’ for
the text.”). Despite the use of the term “community,” I do not mean to preclude
the idea that the audience could in some circumstances be all English-language
speakers.
156. See id. at 630 (“Judges vary their readings of statutes depending on
which community comprises their audience for the decision, and rightly so.”).
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might not be in pari materia with the statute to be interpreted. 157
This certainly does not answer all questions, and a textualist
could certainly criticize the principle as insufficiently rule-like on
the rule-standard continuum. 158 But, the question is a
comparative one: is any other approach, at least short of
abandoning the in pari materia doctrine altogether, both
compatible with textualist principles and more rule-like?
Thought of through this lens, it should not be hard to see how
the Step Zero in pari materia question changes. This approach
shifts the inquiry from an abstract question of subject-matter
similarity, a question that might have a philosopher’s, linguist’s,
or cataloguer’s answer, to the more important question that the
rule-of-law principle underlying textualism pushes us to consider:
Whether those subject to the law might be subject to legal rules
without fair notice.
C. Statutory Audience and Legal Practice Areas as the
Subject-Matter Demarcation Lines
1. Lawyers as Statutory Audience
The question of audience is often fraught, but I want here to
introduce a point about statutory audience in a world of legal and
practical complexity. It is one that many textualists might reject
as irrelevant to statutory interpretation, but one that might
nonetheless help shed light on how a textualist could determine
whether two statutes are in pari materia: An overwhelming
portion of the United States Code—including even, I suspect, the
criminal prohibitions found in Title 18—is not read by those who
are subject to it. 159 Indeed, limiting ourselves to those portions of
157. See id. at 642–43 (describing the communities and the specific
knowledge that they possess).
158. See Nelson, supra note 134, at 349 (arguing that what separates
textualists from others is a greater affinity for rules, rather than a denial that
intent matters in interpretation).
159. See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 105, 105–06 (2003) (“The people who are subject to the law—the
citizens —are almost certain never to read it.”); id. (“Average citizens do not
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the Code that raise litigation disputes, I suspect this may be even
more true. My point here is not that the bad guys do not read the
law at all before committing a crime. 160 Rather, my point is that
those who read the law itself—a statute’s actual language—in its
raw and unexpurgated form, are almost all lawyers and, in
particular, lawyers advising clients. 161 If I am right about this, it
will help us draw the contours of subject matter in ways that will
further the textualist’s goal of fair notice.
Before I turn to the question of audiences more generally,
though, I want to start with an example that might make this
point about lawyers—and its connection to the same-subject
determination—more concrete. Consider two statutes that, in the
abstract, almost everyone would probably agree are not “on the
same subject”: the Securities Exchange Act of 1934162 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 163 Focusing on audience broadly
speaking though—and again, let me emphasize that the focus on
audience is to further the important rule-of-law value, embedded
in a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, that those
subject to the law must have fair notice of the law’s objective
meaning—perhaps these two areas of law should be treated as
peruse statute books even once in their lifetimes; most will never read even one
full paragraph from a court opinion.”).
160. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.)
(noting that “it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the
law before he murders or steals”).
161. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047,
1051 (1995) (“Few would suggest that many, let alone most, of the statutes
drafted today are designed to be read by the ordinary person.”); Farber, supra
note 154, at 289 n.43 (“The vantage point more properly should be that of the
statute’s actual audience—typically, lawyers applying the conventional
approach to statutory interpretation . . . .”); see also Stevenson, supra note 159,
at 145 (“[L]awyers probably constitute most of the actual readership of statutes
and court opinions; as such, they hold a significant, even primary place in the
‘audience’ of the law . . . .”). But see generally id. (arguing that the “written
formulations” of the law are aimed at a set of state actors).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2018).
163. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). I am purposely at a 10,000-foot
view here to illustrate the point. The point of course is that no one would expect
coherence, either linguistic or policy coherence, between these two statutes. One
might find individual provisions within these two statutes that could indeed be
viewed as in pari materia, but I would like to stay at this broad level of
generality for the moment.
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one. After all, the audience for the Securities Exchange Act is the
same as, or at least has a very substantial overlap with, the
audience for the Civil Rights Act: Every publicly traded company
in the country is subject to both statutes. 164 The “audience” for
the statutes thus has significant overlap, and society expects
publicly traded companies to know and comply with both
statutes. But the publicly traded company is of course a legal
creation and abstraction—certainly an important one to further
the goals of modern-day capitalism, but a legal abstraction
nonetheless. 165 Rare is the individual human being who would be
familiar with the details—the statutory language and judicial
interpretations—of both statutes. Perhaps some super-human
General Counsels might fall into the category, but viewed from
the perspective of the actual audience of those who would read
the statutory language, there is probably little overlap between
the two statutes. 166 Civil rights and employment lawyers,
perhaps human resources managers as well, will read the Civil
Rights Act; and securities lawyers will read the Securities Act.
Others will rely on lawyers’ interpretations of those laws to
regulate their behavior. 167 Clients—let us say the CEO or the
Board of Directors if we want to humanize the corporate client—
even if one might put them in the category of “ordinary” persons,
generally do not act without legal advice, and those that do rarely
do so by having consulted a primary legal text such as a
statute. 168 Importantly, one of the reasons ordinary people do not
164. See Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate
Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 263 (2010)
(explaining the Securities Exchange Act’s application to publicly traded
companies); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extends to the conduct of private
actors).
165. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97,
106 (2009) (“One way of describing the corporation is to say that it is nothing
more than a legal construct.”).
166. Cf. Blatt, supra note 155, at 642 (explaining that the statute’s audience
varies “depending upon the substantive area”).
167. See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (“Lawyers are the means by
which the citizenry gets its best glimpse of the law itself.”).
168. See id. (explaining that the directors and officers of a corporation rely
on legal counsel to interpret statutes and provide advice).
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act on the basis of just reading statutory language is a concern
that there may be other, more relevant laws elsewhere in the
statute books. 169 In other words, even knowing that a statute is
relevant to a certain factual scenario tends to be a lawyer’s
task. 170 I will return to this broader point shortly.
In short, to better understand how textualism might properly
be applied to the question of whether two statutes are in pari
materia, one must answer the question of whether the audience
for the two statutes is the same, or whether the audience at least
overlaps. Put another way, one needs to know who the
“appropriately informed” objective reader of the statute to be
interpreted is and what that person knows.
2. Different Audiences for Different Statutes
To further explore this idea, we might think of statutory
language as varying along several dimensions. One dimension
would be how much the language speaks to the regulated versus
the regulator. Let us start with a law that is actually read by
those subject to it, and, for the moment, let us limit ourselves to
laws read by the “person on the street” or on the so-called
“Clapham omnibus.” 171 For this category of laws, the textualist
interpreter would presumably treat the “person on the street” as
the “appropriately informed reader.” Thinking about statutes
through this lens seems to be implicit in many of the textualists’
critiques of intentionalism. I do not want to rehearse here all the
critiques of substantive canons or even linguistic canons (such as
expressio unius or the presumption of consistent usage) based on
ordinary use of language (or how the ordinary person on the
street might understand the language). Nor do I want to reiterate
critiques of textualism based on a realistic assessment of the
169. Cf. id. at 106 n.4 (“[I]t is [a lawyer’s] job to know or find out the
relevant law.”).
170. This is of course why first-semester law students are subject to
issue-spotting exams.
171. See McQuire v. Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100, 109
(explaining that the “man on the Clapham omnibus” is the hypothetically
reasonable person, who is reasonably educated and intelligent, but not legally
trained).
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legislative process. 172 Many of these critiques are based on the
subjective (author’s) perspective, while the textualist’s focus is on
the objective (reader’s) perspective. 173 Instead, I want to focus
here on the objective perspective and explore the importance of
the “person on the street” perspective as it relates to the first step
of the in pari materia doctrine. In particular, for a law whose
audience is the “person on the street,” the approach to
determining if two statutes are in pari materia requires a
determination of whether that “person on the street” could be
expected to look at and/or know the second statute (Statute B)
when interpreting the first (Statute A). If not, the person reading
Statute A could not be expected to know the text, purpose,
jurisprudence, or even meaning of Statute B at all, and it would
be unreasonable for a textualist to rely on that second statute. 174
Relying on Statute B to help interpret Statute A would be, to use
one of Justice Scalia’s favorite examples, like Caligula writing the
laws in small characters and hanging them on high pillars, the
better to ensnare the unsuspecting people. 175
172. See Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 97, at 911 (“A study of
drafting [legislative] ‘reality’ has obvious significance for evaluating canons that
are intended to reflect or affect Congress.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R.
Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV.
725, 780 (2014) [hereinafter Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II] (evaluating
judicial interpretation in light of the realities of the legislative process).
173. See Nelson, supra note 134, at 357–58 (explaining the distinction
between author-focused interpretation and reader-focused interpretation).
174. Cf. Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 866–67 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of interstatutory interpretation
because Congress was likely unaware of a “relatively obscure provision” in the
prior statute when it enacted the second statute). Again, I want to emphasize
that the point of the cross-referencing in the in pari materia doctrine is distinct
from using another statute as evidence of general linguistic usage. If the crossreferenced statute (Statute B) is just used as evidence of general linguistic
usage, then the person reading the original statute (Statute A) would not have
to look specifically to or know specifically about Statute B. However, as I noted
above, such a use of Statute B would not distinguish it as an interpretive aid
from any other use of Statute B’s language elsewhere in the English language.
See supra note 108 (elaborating on this distinction).
175. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike
the practice of Caligula, who reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare
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On the other end of the spectrum along this dimension would
be statutory language whose audience is not individuals or the
regulated entities themselves, but is instead some part of
government other than the legislature that adopted the statutory
language—in particular, an administrative agency. 176 As
Professor Ed Rubin has pointed out, many federal statutes are
what
he
has
called
“intransitive,”
statutes
that
regulate—empower and/or constrain—the regulators themselves,
federal agencies, rather than regulating regulated parties
directly. 177 The language in these statutes has a different
audience, and thus, from the perspective of the textualist, the
“appropriately informed” objective reader should not be the
person on the street, but should instead be the federal agency.
This may be at least one theoretical reason that textualists have
traditionally been open to Chevron deference. 178 If the audience of
a statute is the agency itself, then it, the agency, is uniquely
positioned to understand the statutory language and, certainly
compared with a court, to engage in the interpretive task. 179 The
the people.’”).
176. See Edward L. Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the Administrative State,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2009) (identifying a subset of statutes that
“do not consist of rules governing the populace, but rather they provide
instructions to administrative agencies”); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 625 (1984) (discussing distinction between “conduct rules” that are
addressed directly to the public and “decision rules” addressed to government
officials).
177. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381 (1989) (explaining the concept of “intransitive”
statutes, which are directed at administrative agencies rather than citizens).
178. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (stating that Chevron “will endure and be given
its full scope . . . because it accurately reflects the reality of government”). But
see Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (“Chevron’s inference about hidden congressional intentions
seems belied by the intentions Congress has made textually manifest.”); Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“[C]ourts
should [instead] determine whether the agency’s interpretation is the best
reading of the statutory text.”).
179. See Kavanaugh, supra note 178, at 2152 (stating that Chevron “affords
agencies discretion over how to exercise authority delegated to them by
Congress”).
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agency, in this way of thinking, is the “appropriately informed”
reader, and so its reading is presumptively correct. 180 Key,
though, is that a textualist should not interpret an intransitive
statutory provision by viewing it solely through the lens of the
regulated party and certainly not from the perspective of the
“person on the street.”
Rubin’s use of the phrase “intransitive,” with its contrast
with “transitive,” suggests that these two categories are both
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, that statutory provisions, like
verbs, must be one or the other, but may not be both. 181 I suspect,
though, that despite the phrasing, Rubin well recognizes that the
broader audience of even the most intransitive statutory
provision has to include not only the relevant agency, but also the
regulated entities, even if those regulated entities are not its
primary audience. The Ford Motor Company was no doubt part of
the relevant statutory audience when Congress empowered the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to
create auto safety standards, 182 and just as much as NHTSA,
Ford ought to play a part in the interpretive community that a
textualist concerned with the objective reader should consider. 183
Still, Rubin’s notion of the intransitive statutory provision rightly
helps frame the question of audience through the reality of the

180. See Rubin, supra note 177, at 383 (explaining that an intransitive
statute affords the agency with a high degree of discretion). I say
“presumptively” because Chevron does have a first step, and textualists are of
course more than willing to exercise judicial power to override an agency’s
interpretation when they view the agency as having done violence to the
language Congress used. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S.
218, 225–32 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that the Federal Communications
Commission exceeded its statutory mandate by interpreting term “modify” too
broadly).
181. See Rubin, supra note 177, at 383 (explaining the distinctions between
a transitive statute and an intransitive one).
182. Actually, at the time, it was formally the Secretary of Commerce. See
National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563,
§§ 102(10), 103(a), 80 Stat. 718-19 (granting power to create safety standards to
the Secretary of Commerce).
183. See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 129 (explaining that a statutory
audience “must be the one whose conduct is supposed to be modified by the
communication”).
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administrative state. 184 With statutes whose audience is an
administrative agency, it would be an interpretive error to view
the “appropriately informed reader” as the “person on the
street.” 185
I want to introduce a second dimension along which laws
may be placed, one I alluded to earlier: legal intermediaries
versus individuals/regulated parties. This second dimension may
be a continuous variable rather than, like Rubin’s, discrete and
dichotomous, but it too can help determine who the
“appropriately informed” objective reader is, or perhaps more
accurately, what is the appropriate linguistic community for the
statutory language. When determining whether two statutes are
in pari materia, I contend, this variable will be crucial.
The language of many statutes is aimed at lawyers, or more
broadly, agents rather than principals, or intermediaries between
Congress and the ultimately regulated party. 186 These are not all
the same thing, as I will explain shortly, but, as I mentioned, we
can think of this idea as simply a continuous variable that all
statutory provisions have in some measure, some more than
others. We might take, as a paradigmatic example, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 187 Through a broad purposive lens,
those rules are designed to adjudicate disputes in a fair and
efficient manner, and so, they ultimately do affect litigants and,
secondarily, behavior in the real world. 188 But the direct audience
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is obviously
184. See Rubin, supra note 177, at 373 (“Our dominant implementation
mechanism [of statutes] at present is the administrative agency.”).
185. See id. at 381–84 (emphasizing the administrative agency’s role in
interpreting an intransitive statute as opposed to an ordinary person).
186. See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (“Legislators and rulemakers are
aware that lawyers are their primary readers, and many provisions are included
to anticipate the reaction of readers schooled in common-law terminology and
principles.”).
187. FED. R. CIV. P. (adopted in 1937).
188. See Carl C. Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25
CORNELL L.Q. 28, 29 (1939) (listing the purposes of the rules); cf. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that
when applying Erie’s substance-procedure distinction, federal courts should
apply state law “if the choice of rule would substantially affect . . . primary
decisions respecting human conduct”).

224

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

lawyers—indeed, more specifically, civil litigators—and the
textualist who cares about the “appropriately informed” reader
should expect the interpretive process to be affected by that
fact. 189 To interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through
an objective reader’s lens requires an understanding of what the
appropriately informed civil litigator knows, not what the “person
on the street” knows. 190 For example, the fact that no ordinary
“person on the street” would understand the proper
interpretation of the word “discovery” as it is used in Title V
(Rules 26–37) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plays no
role whatsoever in judicial interpretations of those rules: no
judge, whether textualist or otherwise, would turn to a lay
dictionary to interpret the term. 191 What matters is how a civil
litigator would understand the words. 192 In contrast, perhaps the
paradigm of a type of federal statute whose audience would be
the directly regulated party —indeed, the person on the street—is
the laws found in Chapter 51 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, the federal prohibitions on homicide. 193 Some lawyers may
be murderers, but many murderers are not lawyers.
My claim, however, is that the broad category of laws at the
“lawyers as audience” end of the continuum is not limited to
189. See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (explaining that statutes are
drafted with the knowledge that lawyers are the primary readers).
190. See David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 970 (2011) (“The
Federal Rules address matters in the particular technical competence of
lawyers.”). I recognize of course that some individuals represent themselves pro
se (and also that simplicity, predictability, notice, etc. might themselves be goals
of the procedural system), but I do not view that fact as undermining the basic
point. Cf. Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384
(noting that “[p]ro se litigants are more likely to . . . have problems
understanding and applying the procedural and substantive laws pertaining to
their claim” (citation omitted)).
191. See Marcus, supra note 190, at 970–71 (explaining the misapplication
of canons to the rules because canons capture meaning from the ordinary
person’s perspective).
192. See id. (describing interpretation of the rules from the perspective of
lawyers).
193. See Rubin, supra note 177, at 376 n.21 (distinguishing modern
legislation, which regulates government agencies, from “traditional rules” like
crime, which directly regulate private conduct (citing F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 124 – 44 (1973))).
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provisions like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules whose
impact on primary behavior is indirect at best. Rather, my
contention is that the overwhelming majority of federal laws (or,
perhaps the more important denominator here is not federal
laws, but rather laws that raise interpretive disputes) are actually
read by lawyers, not their clients—and here, by “laws,” I again
mean statutory language—and that this fact should matter,
again at least to the extent that one cares, as textualists should,
about who the appropriately informed objective reader is and
what that person knows.
Now there is obviously a balance to be struck here. Justice
Scalia’s focus on the rule-of-law principle of notice to the
governed 194 is a vital part of the textualist’s interpretive
process. 195 And the importance of law being understandable to
the ordinary person rather than lawyers dates back at least to
Bentham’s contention that lawyers and judges were an elite
caste, a guild, controlling access to vital information at the
expense of the common folk. 196 It is also said to be one of the great
advantages of the civil law system over the common law system,
and of course, Justice Scalia has decried the continuing influence
of common-law thinking in approaches to statutory
interpretation. 197 But at the same time, textualists well
194. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike
the practice of Caligula, who reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare
the people.”).
195. See Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Easterbrook, J.) (reading “not less than 7 days” literally despite clear evidence
that Congress meant “not more than 7 days” because courts should “not pull the
rug out from under a litigant who relied on the enacted text”).
196. See H.L.A. HART, The Demystification of the Law, in ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 21, 29–39 (1982)
(explaining Bentham’s analysis of complex statutes that created the heightened
role of lawyers and judges); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 739
n.89 (1992) (stating that “Bentham and many others [worried] that excess
reliance on technical meanings has the antimajoritarian effect of excessively
empowering an elite of lawyers and judges”); see generally Desai, supra note 146
(noting this phenomena).
197. The title of Justice Scalia’s famous Tanner Lectures was “Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System.” See SCALIA, supra note 121; see also Easterbrook,

226

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

understand that there are times and places for a more technical
meaning. 198 The question, then, is when lawyers rather than the
“person on the street” should be viewed as the statutory
language’s audience. Now, it is true that I am effectively making
an empirical claim without evidentiary support, but the claim is
actually weaker than it might at first appear. In some sense, it is
just a variation of a claim Professor Stephen Ross made over two
decades ago, that statutes usually either apply to citizens “via
administrative regulations . . . or concern special areas of law
that no ordinary citizen would attempt to comply with without
legal advice.” 199
Now, I may be loading the dice in my favor with my example
here, but consider federal tax law. 200 Millions of individuals and
entities are subject to the detailed provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) (and Treasury or Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) regulations). 201 And yet, while many determine compliance
supra note 148, at 82 (noting that pragmatic arguments are “fine in a
common-law world but not in the domain of statutes and regulations”).
Codification too has as one of its goals the simplification of law. See Stevenson,
supra note 159, at 106 n.5 (explaining Bentham’s rationale for creating a
“comprehensive utilitarian code”).
198. See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608–17 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (relying on, among other things, the common law to
interpret statutory text); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 269, 276 (2017) (arguing that though the Constitution’s audience
was the public, “some of the content may have been contained in technical
language (for example, ‘ex post facto Law’) accessible via the division of
linguistic labor between experts (lawyers) and other members of the public”);
Solum, supra note 117, at 500 (noting that “some constitutional language seems
to be technical in nature”).
199. Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1995); see also id. at 1067 (“[M]ost federal statutes are written
for a narrower linguistic sub-community of specialists and lawyers.”);
Stevenson, supra note 159, at 150 (“If the idea is that the words of a statute
should be given the meaning that a non-lawyer would understand, this is odd;
the people do not read the statutes, do not plan around the words. The words
were addressed to state actors, and the question should be what the meaning is
for them.”).
200. See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (identifying “environmental,
antitrust, [and] tax regulations” as areas of the law that are particularly suited
for lawyer interpretation). Apparently, for those in the know, I could also pick
the law of baseball. See id. at 112 (noting that the official Rules of Baseball “are
as tedious and difficult to decipher as the tax code”).
201. See Andrea Monroe, Hidden in Plain Sight: IRS Publications and a
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without a lawyer, virtually none does so by directly
consulting—by reading the language in—the Internal Revenue
Code, Title 26 of the U.S. Code 202 (let alone the Statutes at
Large—more on that distinction shortly). Tax lawyers,
accountants, IRS and Treasury officials, all might be viewed as
part of the relevant linguistic sub-community for the statutory
language actually found in the IRC, but the ordinary “person on
the street” is obviously not in the group. 203 Virtually every
“person on the street”—indeed, almost everyone and every entity
regulated by the IRC—complies by following a computer program
or, at best, by reading an IRS publication. 204 In fact, even many in
the group I have described as the relevant linguistic subcommunity for the statute get their understanding of the
statutory language not from the statute or code but from IRS
publications written by agency employees. 205 While not all of
these people are lawyers, many are. 206 In any event, the precise
contours of the actual linguistic sub-community are not as
important to me as the underlying point, that the audience
(however defined) of some statutes 207 is lawyers. 208
New Path to Tax Reform, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 81, 84 (2017) (describing the wide
breadth of those who “make up the federal income tax community”).
202. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1–9834 (2018).
203. See Monroe, supra note 201, at 83 (“Very few taxpayers turn directly to
the Internal Revenue Code to determine their federal income tax liability.”);
Blatt, supra note 155, at 642 (“Taxation, for example, is the province of a
relatively small cadre of lawyers . . . .”).
204. See Monroe, supra note 201, at 83 (explaining that “taxpayers rely on
intermediaries,” such as commercial software or the IRS to file their taxes).
Moreover, this is how the Internal Revenue Code’s drafters view things too. See
Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory
Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1291,
1336 (2019) (“[Code drafters] are writing with other subject matter experts and
intermediaries (including agency officials) in mind.”).
205. See Monroe, supra note 201, at 84 (explaining that IRS publications
play an important role in interpreting tax law for intermediaries).
206. See id. at 115–16 (stating that most of the tax expert community are
lawyers).
207. And again, let me emphasize that, when I say “statutes,” I mean the
statute’s language, not the statute itself. So while the “audience” for tax statutes
is of course those who are subject to the tax, the audience for the statutory
language is the specialist community of tax lawyers and IRS officials. See Oei &
Osofsky, supra note 204, at 1336 (“[E]xpert intermediaries, not ordinary
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This insight—though perhaps not the empirical claim—is
already embedded in statutory interpretation theory, practice,
and pedagogy. So, while I think Professor Ross should get some
credit for a clear and explicit exposition of the idea, it is implicit
in the notion of technical versus “ordinary” meaning, a distinction
taught in most current statutory interpretation texts. 209
The question of “ordinary” versus technical meaning
intertwines directly with the notion of statutory audience. 210 The
classic case used to illustrate the importance of audience in
statutory interpretation is the 1893 case, Nix v. Hedden, 211 the
famous “Is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable?” case. 212 In Nix, the
Supreme Court had to interpret a federal statute that imposed a
tariff on fruits that was different from the tariff imposed on
vegetables. The Court determined that a tomato was, for
purposes of that statute, a vegetable; and this was despite the
fact that, botanically, a tomato is the “fruit of a vine.” 213
Famously relying in part on the fact that no one has tomatoes for
dessert, 214 the Court concluded that the statute incorporated a
taxpayers, [are] the audience for tax statutes . . . .”).
208. See Blatt, supra note 155, at 643 (“The legal profession itself is one
policy subcommunity.”); see also Rasmussen, supra note 161, at 1052–53
(discussing bankruptcy as an example of this same phenomenon).
209. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 200–09 (5th ed. 2009); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
645 – 47 (5th ed. 2014) (detailing the differences between ordinary meaning and
the technical meaning of words); OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 396 – 98 (4th ed. 2008) (using Nix v. Hedden, 149
U.S. 304 (1893) to introduce the distinction between ordinary and technical
meaning); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 87–92 (2d ed. 2009) (describing how to determine technical
meaning); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND THE
REGULATORY STATE 195–205 (2d ed. 2017) (section on “technical vs. lay
meaning”).
210. See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 204, at 1336 (explaining the relationship
between drafting choices and an expert audience).
211. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
212. See id. at 306 (“The single question in this case is whether tomatoes,
considered as provisions, are to be classed as ‘vegetables’ or as ‘fruit,’ within the
meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883.”).
213. Id. at 307.
214. Id. Obviously, the Justices had never encountered pastry chef Maggie
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lay definition of “fruit,” rather than a technical one. 215 It is
difficult to imagine a textualist objecting to this result, despite
the strength of the dictionary definitions undercutting it. 216
Indeed, the modern-day textualist would probably celebrate the
approach, relying as it does on “the common language of the
people.” 217 But the more sophisticated textualist should go
further, recognizing that the Court relied on the fact that most
importers would view tomatoes as vegetables, not fruits. 218 The
key is not simply that the Court chose a lay definition, but that a
textualist might legitimately view the importer (non-botanist)
businessperson as the “appropriately informed” interpreter. 219
And it is the “appropriately informed” interpreter who should be
viewed as the objective reader of the relevant statutory provision,
here the tariff.
In short, the statute’s audience was traders in tomatoes, not
horticulturalists, and so the Court interpreted the term “fruit”
not to encompass tomatoes, despite the fact that the dictionary
contradicted its conclusion. 220 The flip side of this is of course
cases involving specialized meaning: for example, the
interpretation of contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code,
where specialized usage “in the trade” prevails over ordinary

Huff’s artistic creations, such as “Fresh and Candied Tomatoes with Peaches,
Plums, and Bitter Almond Sorbet,” at Dallas’s famous FT33 restaurant. See
Chelsea Morse, 5 Ways to Eat Tomatoes for Dessert, FOOD & WINE (Aug. 3, 2015)
https://perma.cc/EHV7-S2MV (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (sharing five of pastry
chef Maggie Huff’s ideas for tomatoes as dessert) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Tara Parker Pope, Vegetables Crash the Dessert
Menu, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2018, at D4 (providing examples of ways chefs
around the country have used “vegetables,” including tomatoes, as desserts).
215. Nix, 149 U.S. at 307.
216. See, e.g., Tomato, CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1517 (12th ed.
2011) (defining “tomato” as “a glossy red or yellow edible fruit, eaten as a
vegetable or in salads”).
217. Nix, 149 U.S. at 307.
218. See id. at 306–07 (relying (in part) on the testimony of two importers to
find that in the common language of the people, tomatoes are vegetables).
219. See id. (finding that under a botanical definition, tomatoes are fruits,
“[b]ut in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of
provisions,” tomatoes are vegetables).
220. Nix, 149 U.S. at 307.
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meaning. 221 The “plain” meaning of words may not always be the
meaning apparent to the ordinary reader. 222 To determine the
“plain” meaning, if there is one, requires a determination first of
the relevant linguistic sub-community to whom that meaning
would be “plain.” Were the term “fruit” used in, say, the Plant
Variety Patent Act, 223 the textualist interpreter would
undoubtedly ask not whether sellers or importers of tomatoes
would view tomatoes as vegetables, but instead whether
scientists who might apply for a plant patent would. The relevant
audience for that statute would be different, and the word “fruit”
would thus probably have a different definition; it would not
matter that tomatoes are, as the Court in Nix v. Hedden put it,
not fruits “in the common language of the people.” 224 Moreover,
textualists well recognize the importance of technical meaning
where the intended audience is the “specialized sub-community of
lawyers.” 225 All this is perhaps a long way to say that laws can be
placed on a continuum as to how much the relevant linguistic
sub-community encompasses lawyers, rather than the “person on
the street” and/or regulated parties generally, with the laws of
legal procedure on one side of the continuum and criminal laws
covering, say, violent acts on the other.
3. Textualism, Statutory Audience, and the Same-Subject
Determination
What does all this have to do with the in pari materia
doctrine? My claim is, actually, quite a lot. At its core, Step Zero
221. See U.C.C. § 1-303 cmts 1, 3 (AM. LAW INST. UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017);
see also Ross, supra note 199, at 1067 (noting that “outside arbitrators resolving
disputes under the Uniform Commercial Code” place greater emphasis on trade
usage “rather than on the ‘plain meaning’ of the black textual letters written on
the pieces of paper bound together as the United States Code”).
222. Cf. SOLAN, supra note 88, at 54–55.
223. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018).
224. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
225. See John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV.
419, 434–35 (2005) (“[W]here appropriate in context, textualists seek out
technical meaning, including the specialized connotations and practices common
to the specialized sub-community of lawyers.”).
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of the in pari materia doctrine asks whether two statutes are “on
the same subject,” and textualism asks, in the first instance, who
the “appropriately informed” reader is. Thus, for a textualist to
determine whether a statute (or a statutory provision) is “on the
same subject” as another statute (or statutory provision) requires
determining whether the appropriately informed reader would
know about the other statutory provision and would view it as
being “on the same subject.” Or, perhaps more accurately,
whether the law should expect the appropriately informed reader
to know about the other statutory provision, a “constructive
knowledge” standard, so to speak.
Shortly, I will give some examples to help illustrate how to
make this determination, but you do not have to agree with any
of them to see how this framing changes the core of interstatutory
interpretation. Rather than asking an abstract question about
how similar the subject matters of the two statutory provisions
are, the focus shifts to the core of the first inquiry that a
textualist must make every time s/he interprets a statute, who is
the appropriately informed reader. To be sure, most textualists
usually answer the question implicitly and often with the “person
on the street” as the answer. 226 But, even if that is the answer
and even if one goes so far as to reject the importance of the
lawyer in my Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and tax law
examples, 227 and claim that the “appropriately informed reader”
is always the “person on the street,” the central point remains: for
a textualist to determine whether a second statute is in pari
materia with a first requires determining whether the
appropriately informed reader would know about the second
statute. Here, I am not defining the term “know about,” since as I
said, it would most likely be a “constructive knowledge” standard
and would almost certainly be an objective, rather than
subjective, inquiry. Rather, I am simply delineating in broad
terms the nature of the inquiry, rather than its precise
contours. 228 The key is that a textualist should not really look to
226. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 186–208 and accompanying text.
228. If the appropriately informed reader is the person on the street,
however, the inquiry would likely yield a far narrower category of appropriate
uses of the in pari materia doctrine than if the appropriately informed reader
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another statutory provision elsewhere in the law unless the
appropriately informed reader would do the same. Otherwise, the
same-subject determination could undermine one of textualism’s
most important goals, the rule-of-law value of fair notice to the
regulated party.
Since often that reader is a lawyer, not a “person on the
street” and/or regulated party, determining whether one
statutory provision is in pari materia with another requires
understanding something about whether the “appropriately
informed” lawyer would know about the second statutory
provision. 229 That is one reason, I suspect, that most textualists
are ardent proponents of the Whole Act Rule: context matters
because the appropriately informed reader is expected to read the
entire statute and think of the entire statute as a coherent
whole. 230 A typical “person on the street” would probably not
know to do that, but a lawyer would—or, at least, the law expects
a lawyer to do so. The question this way of framing the
same-subject determination raises then is what other statutes (or
statutory provisions) is the appropriately informed reader
expected to have read and to think of as relevant in the
interpretive process.
D. Applying Textualism to the Same-Subject Determination
Let us turn to a well-known example of the Supreme Court
relying on one statute—actually, several statues—to interpret a
second, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey. 231 While
were a lawyer, a point I will return to below.
229. See supra Part III.C.2.
230. But see Gluck, supra note 26, at 203 (“Absent clear evidence to the
contrary, consistency presumptions should not be applied for exceedingly
lengthy statutes, for different statutory sections within a single statute drafted
by multiple committees, or across different statutes.”).
231. 499 U.S. 83 (1991). Casey is found in most statutory interpretation
casebooks. See, e.g., CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 486–524;
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 859–66 (5th ed.
2014); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 857–69 (5th ed. 2009); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID
CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151–60 (2d ed. 2009).
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the Court never used the phrase “in pari materia,” it was clearly
channeling the concept. 232 Casey involved the interpretation of
the term “attorney’s fee” in a 1976 statute that provided for the
shifting of fees in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 233 The
question was whether the relevant statutory provision, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1988, 234 permitted fee-shifting for testimonial and
nontestimonial experts. 235 One key rationale that Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, relied on was that “[t]he record of
statutory usage demonstrates convincingly that attorney’s fees
and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation
cost.” 236 Looking far and wide throughout the United States Code,
the Court noted that Congress had in some circumstances
explicitly listed “expert witnesses” or “expert witness fees” in
fee-shifting statutes, whereas at other times, it had not. 237 The
Court strengthened this argument with the fact that Congress
had adopted many fee-shifting statutes with language that
explicitly shifted “expert” fees in 1976 itself, the very same year
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the statute that was being
interpreted. 238 Indeed, Congress had passed a fee-shifting
provision with the words “expert witnesses,” in the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 239 “just over a week prior to the
enactment of § 1988.” 240 By negative implication, the Court
concluded that § 1988’s use of the term “attorney’s fee” without
the additional reference to “expert fees” meant that “expert fees”
were excluded and that § 1988 thus did not permit the shifting of
expert fees. 241
232. See NELSON, supra note 231, at 506 (“The principle on which the
majority relies in [Casey] is closely related to the in pari materia idea.”).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); Casey, 499 U.S. at 84.
234. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–559, 90
Stat. 2641, amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat.
1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
235. Casey, 499 U.S. at 84.
236. Id. at 88.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2).
240. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88.
241. Id. at 92.
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Importantly, the array of fee-shifting provisions Justice
Scalia cited was wide-ranging: “[a]t least 34 statutes in 10
different titles of the United States Code explicitly shift
attorney’s fees and expert witness fees,” 242 including statutes on
environmental law, 243 consumer protection law, 244 maritime
employment law, 245 health law, 246 and civil rights. 247 As the Court
put it, “[t]hese statutes encompass diverse categories of
legislation,
including
tax,
administrative
procedure,
environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and
navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights.” 248
In dissent, Justice Stevens focused on the specific intent of
Congress when passing § 1988. 249 He concluded that the goal of
the fee-shifting provision was to make prevailing plaintiffs whole
and that a decision denying recovery for expert fees would create
incentives for attorneys to take on many of the tasks that could
more efficiently be performed by experts. 250 He concluded that
“[t]he fact that Congress has consistently provided for the
inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting statutes when it
considered the matter is a weak reed on which to rest the

242. Id. at 89.
243. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2018);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2018); Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60121(b) (2018); Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2018); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (a)(1) (2018).
244. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h)(1) (West 1993)
(repealed 1994); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a),
2073(a) (2018).
245. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 928(d) (2018).
246. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-31(c)
(2018).
247. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Civil Rights Act
of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2018).
248. West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991).
249. Id. at 104–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id.; see also Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J.) (“To forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage
underspecialization and inefficient trial preparation.”).
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conclusion that the omission of such a provision represents a
deliberate decision to forbid such awards.” 251
Numerous commentators have criticized the majority’s
opinion as “incoherent” 252 or “unrealistic” 253 or worse. 254 I suspect
though that nearly all of that criticism, like Justice Stevens’s in
dissent, comes from those who were unsympathetic to the result
and sympathetic instead to the policy of making the plaintiff
“whole” that Justice Stevens in dissent saw as embedded in the
statute. 255 Moreover, one can also critique the opinion as being
insufficiently realistic about the way Congress really
works 256—even though Congress adopted several other
fee-shifting provisions around the same time, 257 it seems
251. Casey, 499 U.S. at 115–16.
252. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hosps.
Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687,
689 (1992) (arguing that the result of Casey is a “[c]ourt-imposed incoherence,
blind both to the manifest congressional purpose and to the real-world
consequences of the literalistic reading”).
253. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 189–93 (critiquing the “exclusively
text-based comparisons of isolated statutory provisions” in the majority’s
opinion in Casey and other cases as reflecting an “impoverished and politically
unrealistic view of legislation and the legislative process”); cf. Bressman &
Gluck, supra note 172, at 781 (finding that of the forty-one statutes the Casey
Court cited, only four came from the Judiciary Committee, while the rest of the
statutes came from other Committees).
254. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 179 (arguing that the majority’s opinion
reflected an “impoverished” view of legislation and the legislative process).
255. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This Court’s
determination today that petitioner must assume the cost of $104,133 in expert
witness fees is at war with the congressional purpose of making the prevailing
party whole.”).
256. See id. at 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s
inattention to the legislative history of the statute and Congress’s desire to
require courts to shift fees in civil rights cases); Buzbee, supra note 1, at 179
(arguing that text-based comparisons of statutes ignore the reality that
“Congress enacts laws in different periods, to be implemented by different
agencies and administrations, against a different backdrop of case law, statues,
and agency regulation”); Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 252, at 693–98
(critiquing the majority’s ignorance of Congress’s “long-standing policy that
successful civil rights plaintiffs be able to recover the costs of vindicating their
rights” and its attempt to respond to Supreme Court cases intruding on that
policy); see also infra Part IV.
257. See supra notes 242–248 and accompanying text.
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plausible, perhaps likely, that no one in Congress at the time
realistically considered the negative implication, because the
relevant drafters may not have even been aware of those other
fee-shifting provisions with their explicit reference to “experts.”
But as Professor (now, Dean) John Manning has pointed out,
these sorts of arguments, based in either purposivism or
subjective intentionalism, are precisely what a good textualist
seeks to eschew. 258 My point here is not to take sides in this
debate, but simply to point out that none of the criticism takes
textualism seriously as the driver of the decision. The so-called
Meaningful Variation Canon 259 is a staple of the textualist
toolbox, and none of the critiques takes on the question of
whether the decision might (or might not) represent an
objective-reader approach to statutory interpretation.
So, I want to look at the case through the lens of textualism
itself, focusing on the notion of objectified intent and the
appropriately informed reader. We can in fact critique aspects of
Justice Scalia’s reasoning—although, as we will see, not
necessarily the result—as not being sufficiently textualist. By
that, I mean that Justice Scalia may well have been too much of a
subjective intentionalist, failing to focus on objectified intent. 260
Now, I should back up to note that one almost trivially easy
textualist argument would have been based on plain meaning, to
say simply that an expert is not an attorney and so the term
“attorney’s fee” does not include an expert’s fee. The problem was
that that argument was precluded by a case two years earlier,
258. See Manning, supra note 225, at 443–45 (in the context of discussing
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Casey, noting that textualists reject “the impulse to
make the semantic details of a statute more coherent with its apparent
animating policy—the impulse that underlines classic intentionalism . . . .”).
259. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 109 (2016).
260. See Manning, supra note 225, at 424 (arguing that textualists focus on
objectified intent, “the import that a reasonable person conversant with
applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words”).
I want to emphasize again that my discussion focuses entirely on what I’m
calling “Step Zero” of the in pari materia doctrine, whether two statutes are in
fact “on the same subject,” i.e., whether two statutes should be treated as one for
purposes of interpretation. I am not concerned with what I’m calling the
application of the in pari materia doctrine, what the interpreter should do after
determining that the two statutes are in pari materia.
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Missouri v. Jenkins, 261 which had held that the same term,
“attorney’s fee,” in the very same statutory provision, 42
U.S.C. § 1988, applied to more than just “attorney[s]” in a literal
sense: it also covered the fees of paralegals, law students, and law
clerks who had not yet passed the bar, none of whom were
“attorney[s]” in the literal sense either. 262 The dictionary alone
could thus not decide the case. And so, Justice Scalia’s best
argument was rooted in the “statutory usage,” the Meaningful
Variation Canon argument that comes from the inclusion of the
specific term “experts” in those numerous other fee-shifting
statutes. 263
In essence, the question of whether it is appropriate to look
to the other fee-shifting statutes (the “statutory usage,” as Justice
Scalia called it) 264 devolves to a question of whether § 1988 is in
pari materia with those other fee-shifting provisions. For if so, it
would be appropriate to treat them all as, in effect, one statute.
But if not, there would be no reason to think that “statutory
usage” should be consistent, any more than would the use of the
term “attorney’s fee” in, say, German law or Nebraska law or
even some other, non-legal sources.
How to treat “statutory usage” in Casey depends almost
entirely on a characterization of the contours of the subject
matter. Implicitly, the majority is focused on the attorneys’ fee
provision itself. If the law of fee-shifting is the “subject matter,”
then it makes perfect sense for the many fee-shifting provisions
littered throughout the United States Code to be in pari materia
with 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The logic goes something like this: (1) all
fee-shifting provisions are on the same subject; (2) all statutory
provisions on the same subject must be read as if they are part of
one statute; (3) Section 1988 must thus be read in a way that
renders it linguistically coherent with all other fee-shifting
261. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
262. Id. at 285. See also Manning, supra note 225, at 442 (“Under modern
textualism, of course, one could not say that the matter begins and ends with
the conclusion that an ‘expert fee’ is literally not an ‘attorney’s fee.’”).
263. See West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991) (“We
think this statutory usage shows beyond question that attorney’s fees and
expert fees are distinct items of expense.”).
264. Id.
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provisions, including many that contain explicit references to
experts; and (4) therefore, applying the Meaningful Variation
Canon, 265 the absence of an explicit reference to experts in
Section 1988 means that experts are not included in Section 1988
(or, presumably, any time the term “attorneys’ fees” is used by
itself).
The problem with that argument, though, is that one can just
as easily characterize the “subject matter” of Section 1988 as
anti-discrimination law (or, perhaps more broadly, civil rights
law or even poverty law), not the law of fee-shifting. And,
importantly, nothing in an abstract notion of “subject matter” tells
us which of these two categorizations is correct. Indeed, one
cannot even view either of the two categories (fee-shifting v.
anti-discrimination law) as inherently narrower than the other.
The category of fee-shifting covers numerous statutory provisions
not in the category of anti-discrimination law, and vice versa.
These two categories of subject matter are like overlapping circles
in a Venn diagram, with Section 1988 in the intersecting space. 266
How then to choose?
The answer for a textualist, I contend, ought to be found in
the notion of the appropriately informed objective reader. And
this is where I return to my earlier claim that the audience for
many statutes is lawyers. 267 While a fee-shifting provision might
not be as far over on the lawyer side of my lawyer-client
continuum as the rules of civil procedure, 268 it is probably pretty
close. The fee-shifting provision and its interpretation is likely to
affect the civil litigator’s strategy (“Am I going to hire an
expert?”), 269 and while the interpretation may well ultimately
265. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 259, at 109.
266. Compare, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 149–50
(1989) (finding the venue provision of National Bank Act of 1863 to be narrower
than the venue provision of Securities Exchange Act of 1934), with id. at 159
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting that both statutes are narrow along one
dimension: The National Bank Act only applies to banks but covers all causes of
action, whereas Securities Exchange Act only applies to securities cases but
covers all parties).
267. See supra Part III.C.1.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 187–192.
269. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 106–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how
experts generally “save lawyers’ time and enhance the quality of their work
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have
an
impact
on
the
underlying
substance
of
anti-discrimination law and thus on clients, that effect is
secondary. The primary audience for the law is lawyers. But, we
must slice our categories even more finely than that, since if I’m
right that most statutes are read by lawyers, not clients, then
denominating a category of “lawyers” as audience would mean
that the in pari materia doctrine would resemble the nineteenth
century notion that all law is part of a single whole and must
thus all cohere. 270 So, since audience—the appropriately informed
reader—is what matters, the key is to subdivide the category of
lawyers rather than abstractly subdivide the category of law.
Here, then, my claim is that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey
failed to focus sufficiently on objectified intent or the
appropriately informed reader, but instead bled over to subjective
intent. There is, however, a way to focus the inquiry on objective
meaning, and, as I noted, it requires first determining the
provision’s audience and then determining what the law should
expect that audience to know. 271
So, let us look a little closer both at the category of lawyers
who might read Section 1988 and the category of lawyers that
might read the other fee-shifting provisions Justice Scalia relied
on. 272 First, the category of lawyers reading Section 1988 is likely
limited to civil litigators. 273 The question then is whether the
category is more limited than that. My sense is that it is, that the
category can be thought of as civil rights litigators. Notice now
that I am making an empirical claim here, one based on the
product” and that in this case they were “necessary” and “essential” for the
prosecution’s case); Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (“To
forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage underspecialization and
inefficient trial preparation, just as to forbid shifting the cost of paralegals
would encourage lawyers to do paralegals’ work.”).
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See supra Part III.C.3.
272. See supra notes 242–248 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. Annotation, Construction and Application of Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988), Providing that Court
May Allow Prevailing Party, Other than United States, Reasonable Attorney’s
Fee in Certain Civil Rights Actions, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 243, § 3(b) (1979) (“[T]he
purpose of the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act . . . is to encourage
private enforcement of federal civil rights.”).

240

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

sociology of legal practice. The category is, I contend, as a factual
matter, limited to the kind of lawyers who bring or defend claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims that might result in fee-shifting
under Section 1988; very few others would read § 1988.
If I am right about that, then some of Justice Scalia’s
statutory fee-shifting references work and others do not. The
relevant dividing line should be between laws that civil rights
attorneys would know about and those laws they would not know
about. So, Justice Scalia’s references to the fee-shifting provisions
in numerous environmental statutes (Toxic Substances Control
Act, 274 Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 275 Endangered
Species Act 276) and others on energy (Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act Amendment of 1976, 277 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 278), consumer protection (Consumer Product Safety
Act 279), tax (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 280),
and transportation (Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 281
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976282)
would not be relevant, because civil rights litigators simply would
not be familiar with those statutes at all. On the other hand, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 283 and Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) 284 should fit comfortably within the knowledge base of the
audience of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (i.e., lawyers litigating cases under
§ 1983). That is why Justice Scalia rightly emphasized the EAJA
when he noted that the statutes whose fee-shifting provisions
explicitly mention “expert[s]” “encompass diverse categories of
274. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2018).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2018).
276. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2018).
277. 49 U.S.C. § 60121(b) (2018).
278. 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (a)(1).
279. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073(a).
280. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B) (2018).
281. 45 U.S.C. § 726(f)(9) (2018).
282. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94– 210, 90 Stat. 31, repealed by Technical Amendments to Transportation
Laws, Pub. L. No. 103–429, 108 Stat. 4377 (codified as amended 45 U.S.C.
§ 854(g)).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2018).
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legislation,
including
tax,
administrative
procedure,
environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and
navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights”
before mentioning the EAJA. 285
Moreover, the fact that some of these laws were adopted
right around the same time as Section 1988—in particular, the
Toxic Substances Control Act, which Justice Scalia made a
special point of noting was enacted a little more than a week
before Section 1988—ought to be viewed as irrelevant from the
perspective of the “appropriately informed” objective reader. After
all, why would the “appropriately informed” reader of the Civil
Rights Act be expected to know the Toxic Substances Control Act
or when it was adopted? In the abstract, one could imagine an
argument: readers of statutes should know when a statute was
passed and should know other statutes adopted on or around the
same time. The nineteenth century version of the in pari materia
doctrine in fact had a variation of this idea with a rule that two
statutes passed on the same day were to be viewed as in pari
materia. 286 But, this doctrine faded away in time, 287 and probably
with good right. These days, it is the rare individual who actually
reads statutes. We all read codes now. Only where something in
the codified version of a statute raises a red flag would one turn
to the Statutes at Large, and even then, most of the time, one
would not. True, Section 1988’s fee-shifting provision might be
one such circumstance. But looking at the original Civil Rights
Act Amendments of 1976 in the Statutes at Large 288 is certainly
285. West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991)
(emphasis added).
286. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION § 86, at 75, n. 4 (1882). This was a somewhat powerful
doctrine particularly in an era when Congress passed a large number of statutes
on March 3, the last day of the Congressional term. Cf. The Significance of
March 4, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://perma.cc/GNS5-X92B (last visited Oct.
17, 2019) (noting that until 1933, March 4 was the first day of a Congressional
term) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
287. Compare, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 286, § 86, with SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03, at 237–40 (7th ed. 2017)
(noting that statutes passed on the same day should be construed together only
if they relate to the same subject).
288. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (1976).
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not the same as browsing the 1976 Statutes at Large until one
comes across the same or similar (or dissimilar) terms that might
help interpretation. The negative implication argument from,
say, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 might have some
purchase from the perspective of subjective intentionalism, at
least if one is unwilling to delve into the specifics of legislative
history. 289 After all, both statutes were passed by the same
Congress almost simultaneously. 290 Surely if we could
anthropomorphize Congress into a single person, that fact would
be relevant. But by itself, the fact that two statutes were passed a
little more than a week apart is of very little relevance from the
perspective of objectified intent or an appropriately informed
reader. No reader of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would know what other
statutes were passed a week before. No one reads the Statutes at
Large in order, and in any event, the fee-shifting provision in the
Toxic Substances Control Act, though adopted only eight days
earlier, was 600 pages before § 1988 in the Statutes at Large. 291
The question then is what might be relevant to an
appropriately informed reader when trying to determine the
meaning of words in a statute such as the fee-shifting provision
in § 1988. Broadly speaking of course, background principles,
relevant common law, the rules of English grammar and syntax,
certain canons of construction, any number of possible categories.
But how should a textualist determine whether the in pari
materia doctrine applies, whether a second statute is in fact in
pari materia with the statute to be interpreted, whether the
fee-shifting provision in the Toxic Substances Control Act is
relevant to § 1988? The answer, I contend, has to lie in the notion
of the appropriately informed reader: A second statute is in pari
materia with the statute to be interpreted if and only if the
289. Cf. Nelson, supra note 134, at 416 (arguing that textualism should best
be understood as a preference for rules over standards rather than as a rejection
of subjective intent).
290. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 88 (“In 1976, just over a week prior to the
enactment of § 1988, Congress passed those provisions of the Toxic Substances
Control Act.”).
291. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 19(d), 90 Stat.
2003, 2041 (1976); The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (1976).
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appropriately informed reader would know that second statute. I
want to emphasize again one thing about this approach: it is
dependent on a sociological construction of audience, 292 and it is
not necessarily going to yield the same answer over time. That
might be enough to tank the idea in the minds of some
textualists, but it is my contention that textualists are doing this
implicitly all the time anyway—when determining whether two
statutes are in pari materia—and so this approach simply makes
explicit what needs to be explicit to apply textualism to the
determination of whether two statutes are in pari materia.
Now, I suspect that this portion of the opinion, relying on, as
Justice Scalia puts it, “statutory usage,” was not the driver of the
decision. 293 Rather, the fact that the word “expert” is not in the
phrase “attorneys’ fees” and that the term “attorney” does not
ordinarily include an expert was a far more important factor in
the real rationale for the majority. 294 But I raise this issue
because it helps illuminate the key point underlying the
same-subject determination. If textualism is to have a principled
way to determine when one statute is on the same subject as
another, then it requires identifying the relevant audience. It
may be that some applications of textualism do not require this
sort of identification of audience, but the same-subject
determination does. And, even if you think my category for
Section 1988, civil rights litigators, is either too narrow or too
broad (or wrong on some other dimension), one still needs to
answer the question of who Section 1988’s relevant audience is.
It is obviously not enough to say that the objective reader is
the “person on the street” or that one must look to the “plain
meaning,” since the question here is whether or not the
interpreter should look to another statutory provision found
292. See supra notes 272–291 and accompanying text.
293. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88–92.
294. See id. at 99–100 (finding that expert services have never been included
in an attorneys’ hourly rates). But see Manning, supra note 225, at 442 (“Under
modern textualism, of course, one could not say that the matter begins and ends
with the conclusion that an ‘expert fee’ is literally not an ‘attorney’s fee.’”). The
6–3 majority included three Justices who had dissented from Missouri v.
Jenkins, the case that held that the term included paralegals, law clerks, etc.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 274 (1989).
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elsewhere in the United States Code. The question is completely
orthogonal to one about “plain meaning,” and so “plain meaning”
plays no role. 295
E. Textualism’s Audience Problem
My claim raises several issues, both about textualism and
about statutory interpretation in general. The first and most
obvious is my claim that a textualist’s need to focus on audience
necessarily requires thinking about lawyers and thus
lawyering. 296 As I noted, I suspect many textualists would resist
this idea, in large part because of the way in which textualism’s
notice rationale has been intertwined with the Benthamite notion
that the law must be understood by the “person on the street.” 297
It may be that we should broaden our conception of the relevant
linguistic sub-community beyond a group of lawyers to include
regulated parties as well. But, as I hope was clear from my
example of the Civil Rights Act and the Securities Exchange
Act, 298 doing this might broaden the concept of “same subject
matter” to the point that any statute anywhere is fair game for
interstatutory cross-referencing, rendering the concept so
capacious as to be unhelpful in constraining judges at all—in
effect, a Whole Code Rule. It may well also be that, when
thinking about a statute’s “shared context,” as Professor Solum
has put it, one must incorporate not just the post-adoption
statutory audience but also those participants in the legislative
process who, although not drafters in literal terms, are in fact
participants in the complex communicative process that results in
legislation. 299
295. Just to reiterate: one can of course look to the ordinary meaning of the
term “attorneys’ fees” and conclude that the term excludes experts. The question
here though is whether or not the “statutory usage,” as Justice Scalia put it, id.
at 88, elsewhere in the United States Code can be viewed as relevant for
understanding the term. On that question, the concept of “plain meaning” plays
no role.
296. See supra Part III.C.
297. See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part III.C.1.
299. Conversation between Professor Larry Solum and author.
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Second, as may be clear by now, the fundamental question
Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine asks of the textualist is,
how much trans-statutory context is a judge permitted to draw
on. Thought of narrowly, the question is one about statutory
interpretation. Thought of broadly, though, it can also be thought
of as a question of institutional choice. Federal judges are
generalists, while outside of the elite appellate and Supreme
Court bars, most lawyers are specialists. 300 Indeed, most of the
principles of statutory interpretation, like the principles
embedded in trans-substantive areas of the law such as, say,
administrative law or even some of the traditional common law
subjects such as “property law,” are almost consciously and
perhaps explicitly designed to transcend a single subject
matter. 301 In some ways, then, my proposal may appear to
undermine (or at least sit in tension with) the basic idea that
there ought to be trans-substantive principles of statutory
interpretation. 302 After all, the proposal draws boundaries based
on lawyering practice groups that are not trans-substantive in
the way Article III courts or the Supreme Court practice at an
elite D.C. firm would be. 303 This is all true.
My only real defense is that some lines must be drawn and
that this is precisely what Step Zero of the in pari materia
doctrine should be doing, determining when a trans-substantive
principle of law applies and when it doesn’t. Without some kind of
limitation on the in pari materia doctrine, it amounts to a carte
300. See Neal Katyal & Morgan Goodspeed, The Future of Appellate
Advocacy? More Generalists, Fewer Appeals, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (2016)
(noting that appellate lawyers are the rare generalists, as lawyers continue to
specialize, and that “[f]ederal judges are generalists”).
301. Cf. Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325, 342 (2016) (“Trans-substantive
norms also inform statutory construction. Interpretive norms are
‘trans-substantive’ if they are attentive to systemic concerns that transcend the
specific statutory regime under review.”).
302. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Dynamic Theorization of Statutory
Interpretation, 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2, 29 (2002) (“The new textualism
presents itself as a trans-substantive theory: whatever the subject area, the
statutory plain meaning must trump all other considerations (except when the
result is just so unreasonable as to be absurd).”).
303. See Katyal & Goodspeed, supra note 300, at 368 (describing appellate
practices as more generalist).
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blanche for courts to pick and choose helpful interpretive aids
from wherever they find them. In other words, Step Zero of the in
pari materia doctrine demands that the interpreter draw some
lines. Doing so not only creates boundaries around a statute by
delineating its “subject matter,” but also effectively draws a line
between the general and the specific, a line determining in effect
how much courts as generalists may draw upon the whole corpus
of law to decide a case about a single statute. Thus, any
determination of when interstatutory cross-referencing is
appropriate will have the effect of cutting off some portions of the
statutory corpus. By asking a textualist court to think of the
problem through statutory audience and thus, as I have argued,
through the lens of legal practice areas, 304 this fact does not
change. Moreover, since the proposal is based on a “constructive
knowledge” standard, the proposal does not directly dictate
precisely where the boundary between the general and the
specific should be. 305 If, taking Casey as an example, we expect
the lawyer who litigates Section 1983 cases to know about the
Toxic Substances Control Act’s attorneys’ fee provision, then the
latter would be deemed to be in pari materia with Section
1988. 306 In fact, if we think of the problem through the lens of a
lawyer at the Solicitor General’s Office, DOJ Civil Appellate, or
an elite appellate practice at a firm like Jones Day or O’Melveny
& Myers, then expecting the lawyer to treat these two fee-shifting
provisions as in pari materia doesn’t seem all that unreasonable.
Surely an appellate specialist would research and look to the use
of a similar term elsewhere in the law to help shed light on the
term’s meaning. 307 As I said, such an approach might expand the
in pari materia doctrine to such a point that it starts resembling
the nineteenth century notion that all statutes should cohere,
which is not too different from not really having any limitations
on statutory cross-referencing at all. 308 The key point, though, is
304. See supra Part III.C.
305. See supra Part III.C.3.
306. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991).
307. See Katyal & Goodspeed, supra note 300, at 368 (describing appellate
practice as more generalist).
308. See supra notes 286–287 and accompanying text.
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that the relevant inquiry is the choice of statutory audience,
combined with a determination of how much the law is going to
expect those in that statutory audience to know. 309 My own
inkling is that a category like “civil rights litigator” is more
appropriate than “appellate lawyer” for Section 1988’s audience,
but that choice certainly shapes the result. 310
Moreover, the way in which one draws the lines could result
in a self-reinforcing feedback loop. 311 If the law tells lawyers to
look elsewhere in the U.S. Code to understand the meaning of a
law being interpreted, they will be more likely to do so. If the law
says not to bother, they will not.
Relatedly, the determination of how much to expect of the
audience, however defined, can thus have an impact on the costs
of litigating a statutory-interpretation dispute. This point
parallels the arguments about costs in the legislative-history
debate, both decision costs in the narrow sense, but also to the
extent that the question of costs includes litigation costs. The
more broadly a court is willing to allow trans-statutory
cross-references, the more lawyers will need to devote resources
to finding such cross-references. This is precisely the fear that
textualists have voiced about the use of legislative history, known
as “Justice Jackson’s lament.” 312 This dovetails back to a point I
made earlier: the textualist who cares about decision costs should
want a narrower in pari materia doctrine because a narrower in
pari materia doctrine reduces decision costs and thus litigation
costs. 313 In my 42 U.S.C. § 1988 example, that would counsel for
309. See supra Part III.C.
310. See supra Part III.D.
311. I am indebted to Professor Craig Green for this point.
312. See Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and
Comparative Perspectives on the Availability of Legislative History, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 152 (2003) (“[Justice Jackson] voiced his concern that the
materials of legislative history were not readily available to all lawyers arguing
cases before the Court.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory
Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower
Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 70 (2018) (discussing the
impracticability of Justice Jackson’s “committee reports only” compromise “in an
era of unorthodox lawmaking characterized by omnibus legislation, emergency
legislation, and massive last-minute amendments”).
313. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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“civil rights litigators” rather than “appellate lawyers” as the
proper audience. It would thus support my claim that Justice
Scalia was correct to cite the attorneys’ fee provisions in the
EAJA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but that he was wrong to
cite the attorneys’ fee provisions in the array of other statutes on
which he relied. 314
In sum, for a textualist to make a same-subject
determination requires grappling with the question of statutory
audience, because textualists care about interpretation from the
objective-reader’s perspective. In many cases, I suspect it also
means grappling with the world of lawyers, not just the world of
law, and in many cases, it requires delineating subject matter
based on the lines of legal practice. 315 As I noted before, I
recognize that it is somewhat counter-intuitive to treat law’s
audience as being lawyers rather than the regulated parties. 316
But, the basic idea is that even if the law’s audience is a
regulated party, the audience for the statutory language is
lawyers. 317
Just as importantly, even if you don’t accept the details of my
argument, the fact that the same-subject determination requires
far more than the known tools of textualism helps us understand
one important facet of textualism, the importance of defining a
statute’s “appropriately informed” reader in the relevant
linguistic sub-community.
IV. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Intentionalist
Modality in Statutory Interpretation
A. Intentionalism and Purposivism
Subjective intentionalists who care about Congressional
intent would likely view the question of whether two statutes are
in pari materia differently from textualists whose focus is on
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra notes 274–285 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
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objectified intent and the appropriately informed reader. 318 If an
interpreter cares about actual Congressional intent, one place to
go of course is the legislative history. But I want to sidestep the
legislative-history debate and assume that the legislative history
says nothing useful about the relationship between the two
statutes. In such circumstances, what should the committed
intentionalist do to determine whether two statutes are in pari
materia?
The answer most courts give, at least implicitly, is to have
intentionalism bleed over to purposivism but to do so with a dash
of imaginative reconstruction. 319 I want to emphasize here the
differences between subjective intentionalism and purposivism as
modalities
of
statutory
interpretation.
By
subjective
intentionalism, I mean what has traditionally been referred to as
just plain “intentionalism,” a notion whose origins date back at
least to Blackstone, who wrote that “[t]he fairest and most
rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by
exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made.” 320
Intentionalism thus instructs the interpreter to focus on
gleaning the actual subjective intent of the legislature at the time
it adopted the statute. This approach has been subject to attack
on many grounds, particularly the view that a collective body can
have no intent. 321 But I want to ignore that critique here, since
318. See supra Part III.C.
319. See supra Part II (outlining what courts do to determine if statutes are
in pari materia).
320. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59 (1803). Textualists have of
course appropriated Blackstone as their own, and with some good right. See,
e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism:
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L.
REV. 121, 142 (2018) (arguing that “the Constitution’s structure supports
textualism” based in part on James Wilson’s citation of “Blackstone’s textualist
method of construing statutes”). But it is still probably fair to say that subjective
intentionalism has played a role throughout the history of Anglo-American
interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the ‘Judicial Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1002 (2002) (discussing Blackstone and the role of
subjective intent of legislators in eighteenth century statutory interpretation).
321. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870
(1930) (“A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with
words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number
rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have
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my goal is simply to give those who are intentionalists tools for
thinking about the same-subject determination when there is no
evidence about specific legislative intent. After all,
many—indeed, most—judges care about legislative intent in some
measure, based on the presumption that the legislature is the
primary policy-making body in our society and that the judge’s
job is to be the legislature’s “faithful agent.” 322 For such
interpreters, subjective intent matters. 323
Intentionalism contrasts with purposivism. 324 Though there
is some overlap in the group of proponents of these two
interpretive modalities, the two are distinct, 325 and I want to be
clear that my proposal in this Part is aimed at intentionalists, not
had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and
purposes and motives; collections of individuals do not.”). But see Elizabeth
Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND POLITICS 360, 363 (Keith E. Whittington & Daniel Kelemen eds., 2008)
(citing MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003)) (“Although Arrow’s Theorem
suggests that collective decision-making may lead to irrational outcomes and
other social choice work points to the possibility of instability in collective
bodies, neither demonstrates that all collective choice will be meaningless.”);
CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILLIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 4 (2011) (“Some talk of group agents may be
metaphorical, to be sure, and some may misconceive reality. But often the
ascription of agency to groups expresses a correct and important observation,
both in common and in scientific discourse.”); MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at
135–36 (“[M]achines do not have minds, nor does Congress—the only important
question is “how” they decide. So, too, the question here is not whether Congress
has a mind but how it decides and what it means by its decisions.”); Lawrence
Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 449 (2005) (“Therefore, when judges
speak of legislative intent and attribute reasons to the legislature as though it
were a single individual with a mind of its own, they are simply doing what we
all do when we talk about deliberative groups.”).
322. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2010) (“The view that federal courts function as the
faithful agents of Congress is a conventional one.”).
323. See id. (“[T]he classical approach to statutory interpretation[] claims
that a judge should be faithful to Congress’s presumed intent rather than to the
statutory text when the two appear to diverge.”).
324. See Garrett, supra note 321, at 361–66 (intentionalism), 369–72
(purposivism).
325. See id. (describing purposivism and intentionalism).
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purposivists. In fact, as I alluded to earlier and will explain in
more detail below, the current approach—ad hoc as it is—may
well be a better way of thinking about the relationship between
two statutes through a purposivist lens than would my proposal
in this Part of this Article.
Purposivism has its roots in the so-called “mischief rule,”
dating back at least to Heydon’s Case in 1584. 326 Its most
prominent modern expositors though are Hart and Sacks. 327 The
“mischief rule” is the notion that the interpreter must first
identify the “mischief,” the problem in the state of the real world,
that the legislature intended to correct when passing the statute
and then “to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy.” 328 Drawing on this way of
thinking, Hart and Sacks famously added an explicit reference to
the “reasonableness” of the legislators. 329 Purposivists in the Hart
and Sacks/Legal Process tradition are thus to assume in the
course of determining a statute’s purpose that, “unless the
contrary unmistakably appears, . . . the legislature was made up
of
reasonable
persons
pursuing
reasonable
purposes
reasonably.” 330 Of course, intentionalists also care about
statutory purpose at some level, but an intentionalist would
identify purpose by focusing on evidence about the views of the
actual enactors. 331 This would be distinct from the hypothetically
326. See Heydon’s Case [1584] 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a.; see also
Elliot Coal Min. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616,
631 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A]dditional support for our parsing of the text of the
Act . . . can be found in the ‘mischief’ rule, discussed in the venerable Heydon’s
Case. . . . That canon of construction directs a court to look to the ‘mischief and
defect’ that the statute was intended to cure.”).
327. See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2042–43 (1994) (summarizing the contributions
of Hart and Sacks to purposive statutory interpretation scholarship).
328. Heydon’s Case at 638.
329. See HENRY MELVIN HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1954) (“Why would reasonable men,
confronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to replace it?”).
330. Id. at 1378.
331. See Garrett, supra note 321, at 369 (discussing broad goals of
intentionalism).
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“reasonable legislator” that a purposivist in the Legal Process
tradition would use. 332
If we focus then on the subjective intentions of the actual
legislators, one might ask why other statutes should be relevant
to the interpreter at all. This of course would naturally lead to
the question of whether the specific lawmakers believed that the
putatively in pari materia statute was “on the same subject” as
the statute to be interpreted. One could also frame the question
slightly differently and ask instead whether the legislators
believed that the two statutes should be treated as one. The
answer to these two questions might well be different. It is easy
to imagine legislators viewing two statutes as being on the same
subject in the abstract, but not wanting courts to treat them as
one from the perspective of either textual/linguistic consistency or
policy coherence. As we will see though, my proposal elides this
distinction, in part because I am addressing circumstances when
there is no evidence of legislative intent.
But there is the preliminary question of why, if at all, other
statutes should be treated as relevant if one cares about
subjective intent. As I noted, the most viable answer would of
course be that the actual legislators thought the second statute
was in fact relevant to the first. So, naturally, if there were
evidence of specific intent, such as evidence from legislative
history, a subjective intentionalist would presumably view that
evidence as highly relevant to, if not dispositive on, the question
of whether the second statute should be used when interpreting
the first.
There might, however, be other considerations that a
subjective intentionalist would take into account, particularly if
there were no evidence of specific intent. And these other
considerations seem to be at least one factor that courts are
attempting to intuit when they seek to answer the question of
whether two statutes are on the same subject. So, for example,
courts that look to the placement of a provision within the United
States Code, 333 simultaneity of adoption, 334 or just a broad
332. See id. (“[A]ll three foundational theories incorporate some purposive
analysis. What distinguishes the theories is how the purpose is identified.”).
333. See, e.g., United States v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 1982)
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intuitive sense that two laws are on the same subject, 335 are often
attempting to glean a subjective Congressional intent on the
question of whether the statutes are in pari materia. But usually
courts infer the relationship without any explicit evidence of
specific intent, and so we can view these clues of subjective intent
more as a probabilistic assessment of likely intent. Again, though,
the key point is that this is a form of subjective intentionalism
because its focus is on the statutory drafter, not (as textualists
would) the statutory reader/audience. 336 Of course, this approach
can be criticized for assessing the probabilities wrongly. Perhaps
proximity in the United States Code or simultaneity of passage or
even intuitive subject-matter similarity do not really indicate
anything about the legislators’ actual views about whether the
two statutes should be read as one. Perhaps it is always a
statute-by-statute specific inquiry. But the courts grappling with
a rationale for relying on indirect evidence of this sort are likely
engaged in a process of searching for evidence of probable intent.
B. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Legislative Process
If making a probabilistic assessment of legislative intent
might appeal to a subjective intentionalist when there is no
explicit evidence of actual legislative intent, how might a
(analyzing four neighboring statutory provisions in such a way as to have them
“read together to reach a consistent result”).
334. See, e.g., United States v. King, 322 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1973) (“When
[the precursor of Section 191] was reenacted . . . , the forerunner of Section 192
was passed as a companion measure. This coincidence of enactment raises an
inference that the two provisions should be read together as parts of a single
legislative plan.”).
335. See, e.g., Stevens v. C.I.R., 452 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Federal
policy toward particular Indian tribes is often manifested through a combination
of general laws, special acts, treaties, and executive orders. All must be
construed in pari materia in ascertaining congressional intent.”).
336. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV.
419, 419–20 (2005)
[F]ederal judges long assumed that when a statute was vague or
ambiguous, interpreters should seek clarification, if possible, in the
bill’s internal legislative history. . . . [T]extualism . . . is associated
with the basic proposition that judges seek and abide by the public
meaning of the enacted text.

254

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020)

subjective intentionalist do this? In particular, since the in pari
materia question (through the intentionalist lens) asks whether
the legislature viewed the two statutes as on the same subject,
what ought an interpreter consider?
1. Congressional Committees as Proxy for Subject-Matter
My answer is that the interpreter should look to the
lawmaking process. This approach draws on the ideas of much
recent scholarship urging statutory interpretation to become
more sensitive to the legislative process. 337 To determine whether
two statutes are on the same subject, one might then reframe the
question around the organization of subject matter in the
legislature itself.
One frame for this might be the United States Code, which is
of course the place where Congress inserts almost all of its
statutory language. 338 The problem with the United States Code
from the intentionalist perspective though is that it is the rare
337. See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 178, at 4 (“Our constitutional system
charges Congress, the people’s branch of representatives, with enacting laws.
So, how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable
accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected lest
the integrity of legislation be undermined.”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding
Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the
Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1123 (2011) (“It is time to take a serious
look at statutory-interpretation theorists’ views of Congress and how these ideas
stack up against the separation of powers.”); Gluck, supra note 26, at 182 (“In
the absence of formalism, democracy demands at least some attention to
Congress in statutory interpretation or an entirely different theory of
justification yet to fully emerge.”); cf. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of
Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(emphasizing the importance of applying the organization of government to
statutory interpretation as a means of determining legislative intent); Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2003) (“Legislation is the product of choices made
by legislators pursuing aims within the structure of legislative institutions,
rules, and norms.”).
338. See Researching Federal Statutes, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://perma.cc/NB35-NRAA (last updated June 9, 2015) (last visited Oct. 3,
2019) (providing access to all of those statutes) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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legislator who actually thinks about the world through the
organizational lens of the United States Code. 339 Indeed, even
among congressional staffers, a code-focused way of thinking
about law seems limited primarily to the nonpartisan Legislative
Counsel offices in each house of Congress. 340
Instead, the primary lines of demarcation for subject matter
in Congress itself are based on the committee structure. 341
Statutes generally come from a committee, 342 and with some
exceptions (more on this below), much of the language was
drafted either in a committee (i.e., by a staffer or lobbyist who
provides it to the committee) or by a Legislative Counsel staffer

339. See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 735
(discussing legislative methods of drafting, including “structural features like
the centrality of committee jurisdiction, the type of statutory vehicle, the path
the statute takes through Congress, and the requirement that statutes be
“scores” for budgetary purposes—each of which affects how statutes are drafted
and understood inside Congress”).
340. See generally id. at 739–47 (discussing the “central” role of Legislative
Counsel in drafting legislation).
341. See Gluck, supra note 26, at 202 (citing Schultz Bressman & Gluck
Part II, supra note 172, at 747–49) (“The organization of Congress into
committees emerges from the Gluck-Bressman study as the most salient
structural influence, and limitation, on how statutes are drafted and interpreted
inside Congress.”); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 87
(1987) (“The committee system and its division of labor . . . are so successful in
parceling work that anyone interested in a particular subject easily obtains
membership on the committee that deals with it.”); SCOTT ADLER, WHY
CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS FAIL: REELECTION AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
3 (2002) (“In many ways congressional committees are the essential machinery
that propels the legislative process.”); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN
COMMITTEE xiii (1973) (“[M]embers specialize in their committee’s subject
matter, and hence . . . each committee is the repository of legislative expertise
within its jurisdiction.”); cf. also DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 1 (1997) (“Jurisdictions are
property rights over issues. They distinguish one committee from another; they
attract legislators to certain panels, and they set boundaries on what politicians
can and cannot do.”); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION 1 (1991) (explaining that structural features of the legislature
affect legislative outcomes).
342. See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 648 (2012)
(“Congressional committees have been central to lawmaking since the early
nineteenth century.”).
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whose primary responsibilities and expertise are tied to a
committee. 343
The
implication
of
this
fact
for
interstatutory
cross-referencing is probably now clear: Congressional
committees—perhaps even subcommittees—can serve as a proxy
for interpreters trying to determine whether two statutes are on
“the same subject.” The demarcating lines between one committee
and another are precisely the way Congress thinks about and
defines the subject matter of law when it produces, and then
adopts, statutory language. I should reiterate that using
congressional committees in this way is obviously just a proxy for
making a probabilistic determination of congressional intent, and
so I am assuming a lack of specific intent on the question. The
key point is that thinking about similarity of “subject matter”
through the lens of the legislative process gives a subjective
intentionalist a connection between the same-subject
determination and the legislature’s own categories of subject
matter.
This idea, rooted as it is in the lawmaking process, is of
course built on the backs of empirical work in both political
science and law, particularly the seminal Gluck/Bressman
study344 and the work of people like Judge Katzmann 345 and
Professors Nourse and Schacter. 346 Indeed, in the specific context
of the consistent-usage and meaningful-variation canons,
Professor Gluck has made this very point, that the “whole act”
and “whole code” rules should be abandoned. 347 I want to
343. See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 741 (finding
that Legislative Counsel is the primary drafter of legislation).
344. See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 725
(presenting the results of “the most extensive survey to date of 137
congressional drafters about the doctrines of statutory interpretation”).
345. See Katzmann, supra note 342, at 646–55 (providing a broad overview
of the lawmaking process in Congress).
346. See Nourse, supra note 337, at 1177 (critiquing textualism,
purposivism, and game theory as inconsistent with “dominant, evidence-based,
institutional features of Congress”); see also Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (case
study of staffers from the Senate Judiciary Committee).
347. See Gluck, supra note 341, at 203 (“The idea that similar phrases mean
the same thing across an entire statute or that variation of terms is meaningful
even across multiple statutes does not comport with the structural separation of
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emphasize though that because of that, it is rooted in subjective
intentionalism as a modality in statutory interpretation.
2. Legislative Process for Textualists?
A textualist, whose theory of statutory interpretation is
rooted in the objective reader, might still reject this approach to
the same-subject determination for that basic reason. This would
particularly be the case for the textualist who views the “person
on the street” as the relevant objective reader. As I noted in Part
III, this assumption seems to underlie much of the textualist
approach. 348 How, the textualist might ask, is the objective reader
expected to know whether two statutes were drafted by the same
committee? The drafting committee is generally nowhere to be
found in the text. Indeed, the very premise of this whole portion
of the Article is that we have no evidence of specific intent about
the same-subject determination, whether in the text or even in
the legislative history. Through the textualist lens, this is of
course all true.
But even for the textualist, there may be a sliver of merit to
opening up the sausage factory just this one little bit, especially
when compared with the prospect of identifying the
“appropriately informed” reader that I explained in Part III is
necessary to an objective-reader approach to the same-subject
determination. 349 Or, perhaps worse yet, when compared with the
prospect of a highly curtailed version of the in pari materia

committees and the lack of communication between them.”); see also Schultz
Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 781 (noting that the Casey Court
ignored the fact that most of the cross-referenced fees provisions had been
drafted by other Committees).
348. See supra Part III (discussing the textualist approach); see also, e.g.,
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014))
(arguing that judges should first determine the “best reading” of a statute by
reading the statute “as ordinary users of the English language might read and
understand” it).
349. See supra Part III (discussing the importance of identifying the
“appropriately informed” reader in an in pari materia analysis).
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doctrine that a “person on the street”-as-audience approach would
necessitate. 350
First, to the extent that what ultimately animates textualism
is a preference for rules over standards, 351 creating demarcation
lines rooted in the jurisdictional lines of congressional committees
is relatively rule-like. It’s not perfect of course. Many statutes are
drafted by multiple committees, the committees in the two
Houses do not align in terms of their jurisdiction, and perhaps
most importantly, committee jurisdiction can change over time:
names will change, committees will be created, committees will
disappear, etc. 352 So, my suggestion is by no means a true rule on
the rule-standard continuum. 353
At the same time, its rule-like nature does create a
significant reduction in decision costs, thereby promoting another
important value that textualists hold dear. 354 Indeed, the
committee demarcation approach to the same-subject
determination might have lower decision costs than the approach
rooted in the objective reader that I outlined in Part III. 355
Second, an approach rooted in the demarcation lines of
congressional committees could fit with an objective
reader-focused view of statutory interpretation if one accepts the
premise that an “appropriately informed” reader would be aware
of congressional committees. This of course is highly
controversial, and as an empirical matter, may well be false. But
350. See supra note 228.
351. See Nelson, supra note 134, at 348 (“Indeed, textualists themselves
have acknowledged that the contrast between rules and more flexible
‘standards’ is important to their approach.”).
352. See David C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee
Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 48 (1994) (“Jurisdictions are not rigid
institutional facts that rarely change. Rather, they are turbulent battle grounds
on which policy entrepreneurs seek to expand their influence.”).
353. Plus, as I explain below, “unorthodox lawmaking” and different types of
laws make this proposal an incomplete tool at best. See infra Part IV.B.3
(discussing “unorthodox lawmaking” in more detail).
354. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part III (discussing the “objective reader” approach to the in
pari materia analysis). Naturally, an approach that assumed a “person on the
street” as the objective reader would have significantly lower decision costs, but
at what I suspect almost all judges would view as the unacceptable cost of
allowing virtually no interstatutory cross-referencing.
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thinking about this proposal through the lens of the
“appropriately informed” reader again brings into focus the
question of who exactly that person is and what the law should
expect that person to know. 356 Again, if the textualist’s focus is on
the objective reader, the same-subject determination necessarily
requires an answer to the question of who that objective reader is
and thus what that person knows. 357 My sneaking suspicion is
that most textualists would recoil at the thought that the law
should expect any objective reader to know which congressional
committee(s) a particular law came through. The whole inquiry
would likely be anathema to most textualists. But understanding
why can help shed light on the question of how elastic textualism
might be, not only as to the same-subject determination, but also
in general.
For if I am right that the same-subject determination forces
out into the open the question of statutory audience in the theory
underlying the textualist modality of statutory interpretation,
then it also forces open the question of why it would be
inappropriate to think the statutory audience should know the
committee origins of a given statute. I want to reiterate that I
believe most textualists would view the inquiry as illegitimate.
The reasons why are not hard to enumerate: (1) Committees
and/or committee jurisdiction demarcation lines are not in the
text of the law and so nothing about the committees passed
through the Article I, Section 7 process to become law;
(2) requiring courts (or expecting an objective reader) to know
which committee(s) a law went through would increase decision
costs; and (3) as an empirical matter, those who read statutes do
356. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 337, at 1147
Sophisticated textualists . . . sometimes bow to the relevant
‘interpretive community’ but define that community not as the people,
but as expert lawyers. Shifting the inquiry to a ‘relevant community’
has the important virtue of noticing that there is an audience for
statutes, but it raises its own ambiguities: how are we to determine
the relevant audience?
357. Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2118, 2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014)) (positing “ordinary users of the English language” as the relevant
reader).
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not know which committee (or even, with the exception of
revenue bills, which house of Congress!) a statute came from.
Though there may not be satisfactory answers to these
objections (in which case I refer the textualist to Part III), I
reiterate that the question is comparative. Recall that the
same-subject determination is the way in which a court
determines
the
appropriateness
of
interstatutory
cross-referencing, and we are positing that neither the text nor
the legislative history contain explicit clues to help make the
determination. One answer then is of course for the textualist to
conclude that therefore the two statutes are not in pari materia,
that (in essence) the context of Statute A, the statute being
interpreted, does not include the other statute, Statute B. That’s
reasonable enough, but of course, as I noted in Part III, that
would mean that Justice Scalia was wrong in Casey on textualist
grounds. So, I don’t think any textualist is willing to cut him or
herself off from relying on other statutes when there is no explicit
textual evidence that the two statutes are in pari materia.
But I think there are at least partial answers to the
objections laid out above. To the first objection—that committees
are not in the text that became law—the answer lies in an
oft-made critique of textualism, one that intentionalists level at
textualism all the time when defending the use of legislative
history: the linguistic (and substantive) canons that textualists
are more than willing to rely on 358 didn’t pass through the Article
I, Section 7 process either. Since most textualists recognize that
communication
depends
on
the
relevant
interpretive
community, 359 the question is not what did or did not pass
through the Article I, Section 7 process, what is or is not law.
Instead, the question is what tools or evidence a court is
permitted to use in interpreting the law (the words that did pass

358. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13 (listing fifty-seven
“canons,” none of which went through the Article I, Section 7 process to become
law); GORSUCH, supra note 148, at 132.
359. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
533–34 n.2 (1983) (“Wittgenstein showed that no system of language can be
self-contained and that meaning thus must depend in part on logical structure
and understandings supplied by a community of readers.”).
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through the Article I, Section 7 process), 360 and the same-subject
determination asks whether one can look to a different statute.
All my suggested criterion—look to the statutory origins, which
we know are generally found in committees—does is to help make
that determination. It simply assists the reader in the task of
knowing whether or not the broader context of Statute A, the
statute to be interpreted, includes Statute B, the putatively in
pari materia statute.
To the second potential objection—that requiring
interpreters to know the committee(s) from which a law came will
increase decision costs—the question is again comparative:
increased decision costs compared with what? Professor Manning
has praised Justice Scalia’s decision in Casey as a paragon of
textualism because of Justice Scalia’s reliance on “statutory
usage” rather than legislative history. 361 But the decision is based
on a romp through the United States Code. 362 The decision costs
could have been reduced significantly if the Court had limited
itself to statutes that had passed through the same committees as
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Knowing the committee from which a law came
is, literally, a single piece of information that, as a practical
matter, is now easily available for virtually all laws on
Congress.gov, Lexis, and Westlaw. 363
Just as importantly, I want to emphasize that the in pari
materia doctrine can be a purely textualist tool (as it was for
Justice Scalia in Casey and for the Court in Wachovia Bank). The
same-subject determination is simply the method for ensuring
that judges are not given free rein to pick and choose their friends
360. See MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at 66 (“Most importantly, we need
to stop talking about legislative history and start talking about evidence of
legislative decisions.”).
361. See supra Part III.D; see also John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 93–95 (2006) (praising
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey as textualist because of its reliance on
“statutory usage” and contrasting it with a purposivist approach that looks to
“contextual cues that reflect policy considerations”).
362. See supra notes 274–285 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Committees of the U.S. Congress, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://perma.cc/Y9TP-XA2K (last visited October 7, 2019, 4:30 PM) (listing the
committees of Congress and linking to legislation that originated in each
committee).
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wherever they can find them elsewhere in the United States
Code. 364 In other words, a same-subject determination based on a
concrete, easily verifiable, non-manipulable rule-like criterion
like Congress’s committee structure reduces judicial discretion in
the game of interstatutory cross-referencing, thereby furthering a
key goal of textualism. 365
The third objection—that statutory interpreters do not
typically know which Congressional committee a law came
from—may well be correct. But an objection based on what the
objective statutory reader knows is precisely the grounds on
which my big-picture claim in Part III of this Article is premised;
either way, a textualist needs to answer the question of what the
“appropriately informed” interpreter knows. 366 Since viewing the
objective statutory interpreter as the hypothetical “person on the
street” would permit far too little interstatutory cross-referencing
for even the dyed-in-the-wool textualist, 367 the objection cannot be
based solely on the fact that the “person on the street” lacks
knowledge about congressional committees. My own sense is that
the proposal I outlined in Part III—making the same-subject
determination on the basis of legal practice areas, a proposal
rooted in actual statutory readers who are generally lawyers with
some specialization—more accurately reflects what the
sophisticated textualist should seek: the appropriately informed
reader is one who knows about other statutes based on the
dividing lines of legal practice, since the appropriately informed

364. Cf. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 142 (1983) (“It
sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late colleague
Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out
your friends.’” (quoting a personal conversation with Leventhal)); Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (citing
Leventhal quip).
365. See supra note 133. But see Gluck, supra note 26, at 177 (“Even
formalist-textualist judges, it turns out, crave interpretive flexibility, do not
want to be controlled by other courts or Congress, and feel the need to show
their interpretive actions are democratically linked to Congress.”).
366. See supra Part III.
367. See supra Part III (noting that the objective appropriately informed
reader of most laws is not the “person on the street”).
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reader is a lawyer who practices in the area that the statute to be
interpreted is in.
But I return to the textualist at this point to reinforce the
key idea: there is no abstract notion of “subject matter” if one
believes, as most textualists purport to, that statutory
interpretation must be viewed through the lens of the objective
reader. Rather, because the “appropriately informed” reader is
going to vary from statute to statute, one must make a
determination of who the “appropriately informed” reader of the
particular statute being interpreted is and what that person
knows (or, perhaps more precisely, what the law is going to
expect that person to know). Virtually all interpreters expect
statutory readers to know, for example, that statutes often have a
definitions section. Even textualists generally agree that the
definitions section of a statute overrides the “plain meaning” of a
term. 368 Why? As I said earlier, because the “appropriately
informed” reader is expected to scour the statute to look for a
definitions section if there is one. All judges, including
textualists, expect the objective reader to know enough to look for
a definitions section in a statute, no matter where in the statute
(or even in the code) the definitions section might be. But, why
would we expect the reader to do this? In large part because even
the textualist understands that the “person on the street” is not
the relevant reader for the interpretive task. Lawyers know to do
this, but most laypeople do not. 369
Defending this “committee jurisdiction” proposal to
textualists though is not my goal. As I said, this idea is clearly
rooted
in
the
intentionalist
modality
of
statutory
interpretation. 370 So, I want to return to the proposal through the
368. See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (unanimous
decision relying on statutory definition contrary to ordinary meaning); see also
GORSUCH, supra note 148, at 142–43 (praising Digital Realty Trust). But see
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573–74 (1995) (rejecting statutory
definition in favor of dictionary definition); James J. Brudney & Lawrence
Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the
Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 557–58 (2013) (noting
this point); Gluck, supra note 26, at 206 (criticizing this practice).
369. See generally Anuj C. Desai, Textualism Step Zero (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
370. See supra Part IV.A.
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lens of an intentionalist. The proposal is premised on the fact
that, for those involved in the lawmaking process, “committee
jurisdiction [is] a fundamental organizing and interpretive
principle.” 371 Importantly, since the in pari materia doctrine,
whether applied in its linguistic or its policy-coherence sense, is
fundamentally asking about coherence across statutes, it matters
that the “division of Congress into committees creates drafting
‘silos’,” 372 and that there is a “lack of communication across these
committees during the drafting process.” 373
Thus, as a first cut, an intentionalist should conclude that
any two statutes that came out of different committees are
necessarily not in pari materia with each other. But my proposal
goes further, positing that any two statutes that did come out of
the same committee should, at least as a rebuttable presumption,
be treated as in pari materia with each other. That, I admit, is a
tougher sell in purely intentionalist terms, but it does have a
couple of advantages. First, as I noted above, it is relatively
rule-like: even intentionalists put some stock in decision costs,
even if reducing them isn’t an explicit goal. Second, it comports
with what at least a significant proportion of drafters believe. 374
3. Congressional Committees in a World of Diminished Committee
Power
My emphasis on committees does run up against a few trends
in the federal legislative process over the past few decades, such
as the rise in omnibus legislation and the increase in bills driven
by congressional leadership outside of the committee structure. 375
371. Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 747.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 749 (emphasis added); see also id. at 750 (discussing “[d]ifferent
drafting practices and manuals”).
374. See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 749–50
(stating that forty-three percent of respondents say “presumption of consistent
usage applies across statutes in related subject-matter areas precisely because
the same committee is drafting”). To be sure, this evidence is limited to the
presumption of consistent usage and thus to the textual version of the in pari
materia doctrine.
375. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory
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An omnibus statute does not inherently undermine my
proposal as long as the relevant title of the statute came from a
committee. In order to apply my proposal to an omnibus statute,
the interpreter would simply have to treat the relevant title as its
own statute, determine which committee it came from, and then
make the same-subject determination on that basis. To be sure,
omnibus legislation pushes on the broader notion of coherence
across statutes that animates the in pari materia doctrine. 376 But
by itself, the fact that the portions of law being interpreted were
passed simultaneously with other provisions on unrelated topics,
provisions that originated in some other committee (and/or even
the other house of Congress) does not change the basic premise of
my proposal, that defining subject matter through the lens of the
lawmaking process requires a focus on the committee level. 377
Importantly, what matters is that a particular committee played
a role in the relevant statutory language, not how extensive a role
the particular committee played: the same-subject determination,
unlike other aspects of statutory interpretation, is in both theory
and practice a binary variable, an on-off switch, and so is
amenable to the relatively rule-like presumption I am proposing,
notwithstanding subtleties of the legislative process that
minimize the relative importance of committees in the
development of the final product of statutory language.
The rise of legislation driven by and originating with party
leadership though does undermine my proposal. If a particular
statute never touched any congressional committee, then there is
simply no way to connect that statute to a committee. It is
Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to
Omnibus Legislations, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2002) (exploring the
effect of omnibus legislation on traditional canons of statutory interpretation).
376. See id. at 2 (“I will discuss the effect of omnibus lawmaking on canons
of construction, including coherence canons.”); id. at 6 (noting the difficulty of
embedding coherence into statutory interpretation in the context of omnibus
legislation in particular).
377. Although I am purposely avoiding any discussion of statutory
interpretation at the state level, the fact that most states have a single-subject
rule for legislation, a rule with at least a little bite, see Brannon P. Denning &
Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 1005–23 (1999), might diminish this
problem at the state level.
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difficult for me to know precisely how to respond to this
phenomenon, except to say that, if committees were to become a
shell of their former selves and lose their role in lawmaking, then
it would be unreasonable for a subjective intentionalist to use
committees as the demarcation lines for subject matter. That is
the fate of a proposal tied to the realities of the lawmaking
process: it depends on the realities of that process! When that
process changes, so too should a subjective intentionalist’s
approach to interpreting statutes.
V. Conclusion
Statutory
interpretation
practice
abounds
with
interstatutory cross-referencing; and yet statutory interpretation
theory has largely ignored it. Courts have always looked for
interpretive assistance outside of the four corners of a statute
being interpreted, including elsewhere in the statutory corpus.
The in pari materia doctrine is one of the most powerful methods
for using other statutes because it allows an interpreter to draw
on another statute’s text, purpose and/or jurisprudence. Applying
the doctrine not only helps courts understand how to interpret a
particular statute but also helps maintain coherence across
statutes.
To keep coherence within manageable bounds, however,
courts seek such coherence only among statutes that are “on the
same subject;” and so determining whether two statues are on the
same subject becomes a crucial preliminary step in this vital
method of interstatutory cross-referencing.
What I hope to have shown is that this crucial first step in
interstatutory cross-referencing can be tied to statutory
interpretation theory and that thinking about it through the lens
of statutory interpretation theory can help give courts better tools
for making that determination.
Just as importantly, though, I hope to have shown that
thinking about interstatutory cross-referencing through the lens
of modern approaches to statutory interpretation helps us better
understand those approaches themselves. In particular, it lays
bare the fact that textualism requires a more robust theory of
statutory audience. While textualists can answer many
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interpretive questions by eliding the question of audience or by
implicitly assuming the statutory reader is just a reasonably
intelligent layperson, neither answer is of any help in
determining when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate.
My proposed solution to the problem—focus on sub-communities
of legal practice as the relevant linguistic communities—will
probably not satisfy most textualists, in large part I suspect,
because it runs counter to the Benthamite strand in textualist
thinking. But as I hope I made clear, I am not tied to any
particular delineating lines for what constitutes the relevant
linguistic community. Rather, the point is that a textualist
approach to determining whether to engage in interstatutory
cross-referencing requires a careful consideration of statutory
audience and thus an equally careful delineation of the statutes’
relevant linguistic communities. Textualism needs a better
theory of statutory audience, and thinking about the dilemma of
interstatutory interpretation is a good first place to start.

